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OTHER PEOPLE’S PATRIOT ACTS: 
EUROPE’S RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11 
Kim Lane Scheppele* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
September 11, 2001 was a shock not just to the United 
States but to the world.  In the immediate aftermath of 
September 11, expressions of solidarity and collective grief were 
nearly universally expressed by world leaders.1  Both regional2 
and multilateral organizations3 indicated their willingness to act 
with the United States in response to the attack.  The United 
Nations condemned the attacks and urgently called for 
 
 * Kim Lane Scheppele is the John J. O’Brien Professor of Comparative Law and 
Professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania.  Previous versions of this 
paper were given at the symposium on terrorism at the Association of American Law 
Schools in Atlanta, Georgia and at the Institute for Legal Studies, University of 
Wisconsin at Madison.  The author would like to thank participants in these sessions 
for helpful feedback.  She would also like to thank Helen Hartnell for much 
assistance in understanding EU law, Russell Miller for his wise counsel in matters of 
German constitutional law and Serguei Oushakine for his perspective beyond law.  
This paper was completed in mid-March 2004, so later events are not taken into 
account in this analysis. 
 1. World Leaders Express Outrage, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 11, 2001, available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/september11/story/0,11209,600809,00.html (last visited 
May 11, 2004). 
 2. For the reactions of regional organizations, see INTERNATIONAL BAR 
ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 32-38 (2004) [hereinafter TASK 
FORCE ON TERRORISM].  The European Union Council of Ministers had an 
extraordinary session shortly after September 11 and expressed its solidarity and 
cooperation with the United States.  Press Release, European Council, Conclusions 
and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting (Sept. 21, 2001), 
available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf. 
 3. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked the mutual defense 
provision of the NATO charter under Article 5 by declaring that if this were a foreign 
attack on the United States, then it would be considered an attack against all NATO 
members.  Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the 
North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm. 
SCHEPPELE-12-FI-RSB 6/25/2004  5:29 PM 
90 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 50 
international cooperation to bring justice to those responsible for 
the atrocities.4  The attack was widely perceived as being not just 
on the United States but on the “civilized world.”5  In those first 
few days before America’s disbelief turned to intense national 
patriotism, there was a widespread sense that, while the attack 
may have been specifically directed against the United States, the 
whole world felt the pain. 
Since September 11, America’s own reaction has become 
more inward-looking, unilateral, and self-absorbed.  The rest of 
the world, however, is still engaged by September 11 and its 
continuing threats.  In particular, America’s European allies, 
though split over the justifiability of the attack by the United 
States on Iraq in the spring of 2003, have by and large adopted a 
posture supportive of and complementary to that of the United 
States in the ongoing fight against terrorism.  This Article 
examines the developing legal framework of Europe’s response to 
September 11, first by examining the international legal basis for 
Europe’s actions,6 then the responses of the European Union (EU) 
itself,7 followed by the legal reforms of two of the EU member 
states who represent the most starkly opposed trajectories of 
reaction—Germany8 and Britain.9  In closing there is an 
examination of the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ decisions on terrorism-related issues after 
September 11,10 since it urges caution in the name of human 
rights against overreacting to the terrorist threat.  Though there 
is a common sense that September 11 requires a strong response, 
there is a great variation in the extent to which preserving 
respect for human rights and civil liberties is considered an 
equally important task. 
 
 4. G.A. Res. 1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV1 (2001), 
available at http://ods-ddsback-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/475/00/PDF/ 
N0147500.pdf?OpenElement. 
 5. Tony Blair started using this term shortly after September 11.  Philip 
Webster, We Will Not Stop, We Will Not Flinch, Blair Tells Assembly, TIMES OF 
LONDON, Oct. 31, 2001, 2001 WL 29001014. 
 6. See infra Part II.A. 
 7. See infra Part II.B. 
 8. See infra Part III.A. 
 9. See infra Part III.B. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
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II.  THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1373 
The international framework for national legal changes in 
response to September 11 was given first and foremost by an 
extraordinary resolution of the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council, passed on September 28, 2001, while the wreckage of the 
Twin Towers still smoldered a short distance away.  In Resolution 
1373,11 the Security Council required all states to take a wide 
variety of measures to fight terrorism—including, among other 
things, cutting off financing of terrorist acts, taking steps to 
prevent terrorism, criminalizing participation in terrorist attacks, 
refusing safe haven to terrorists, and preventing the state’s 
territory from being used for terrorism.12  Resolution 1373 also 
called for increased international cooperation in fighting 
terrorism, for more comprehensive sharing of information and for 
intensified restrictions on the movement of terrorists.13  
Resolution 1373 was adopted under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, since the Security Council determined that the 
attacks of September 11 constituted “a threat to international 
peace and security.”14  Under Chapter VII, the Security Council 
may direct member states to comply with the program it has 
adopted, rather than merely suggesting or recommending courses 
of action.15 
Resolution 1373 set up a special monitoring body, the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which receives reports from 
member states indicating their compliance with the resolution.16  
To date, this committee has received initial reports from nearly 
all of the member states of the United Nations and as many as 
three or four reports from some countries.17  The CTC reviews 
these reports and asks specific and pointed questions of the 
member states, obviously prodding them toward further 
compliance with the resolution through specific and concrete 
 
 11. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 
(2001), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001.htm. 
 12. Id. at 2. 
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. 
 15. Id. art. 39. 
 16. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 11, at 3. 
 17. United Nations, Counter-Terrorism Committee, States’ Reports, at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/reports.html (last visited May 11, 2004). 
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directions. 
As human rights experts noted, however, Resolution 1373 
contained two worrisome gaps—the lack of any definition of 
terrorism18 and the lack of any mandatory concurrent compliance 
with human rights norms in carrying out the fight against 
terrorism.19  Since the start of international efforts to fight 
terrorism, attempts to create a comprehensive approach to 
counter-terrorism policy have been stalled again and again by the 
absence of agreement on what “terrorism” encompasses.  Can 
terrorism be committed by states or only by sub-national entities?  
Is it a set of specific techniques?  Or necessarily attached to an 
overt political program?  Are the violent tactics used by 
independence movements included in the definition of terrorism?  
Can criminal networks like drug traffickers or money launderers 
be counted among terrorists?  Questions like these have 
prevented international agreement in the past, and rather than 
wait for a common view of what terrorism includes,20 the Security 
Council acted to enlist the energies of member states to fight it.  
Without some common definition of terrorism, however, there is a 
concern that states will use counter-terrorism efforts to suppress 
political opposition or use militaristic techniques against “mere” 
criminals.  The potential to apply the “terrorism” label to any 
politically disruptive individuals or groups carries with it a clear 
potential for abuse. 
Another major worry about Security Council Resolution 1373 
is that it does not explicitly link compliance with the resolution to 
compliance with human rights norms.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock, 
the first chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, made 
the disconnect clear: 
The Counter-Terrorism Committee is mandated to monitor 
the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). Monitoring 
performance against other international conventions, 
including human rights law, is outside the scope of the 
 
 18. TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 30. 
 19. Id. at 31. 
 20. The UN General Assembly is apparently working on a framework treaty for 
dealing with terrorism, but the link on the CTC’s website to a definition of terrorism 
points only to the General Assembly webpage without any further detail.  United 
Nations, Counter-Terrorism Committee, A Definition of Terrorism, at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/definition.html (last visited May 12, 
2004). 
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Counter-Terrorism Committee’s mandate.  But we will 
remain aware of the interaction with human rights concerns, 
and we will keep ourselves briefed as appropriate. It is, of 
course, open to other organizations to study States’ reports 
and take up their content in other forums.
21
 
Since the UN system’s provisions for monitoring human rights 
compliance consists only of bodies that have the power to “name 
and shame” without the power to mandate specific actions on the 
part of states that violate human rights, the abdication of the 
human rights field by the Security Council’s own terrorism 
committee is disturbing because only the Security Council has the 
power to order sanctions. 
B.  THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Since terrorist attacks have a longer history in Europe than 
in the United States, a number of European countries—Britain, 
France, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain among them—already 
had enacted comprehensive counter-terrorism laws before 
September 11.22  The European Union (EU) itself did not have 
such a comprehensive, substantive framework for fighting 
 
 21. United Nations, Counter-Terrorism Committee, Terrorism and Human Rights 
(quoting Sir Jeremy Greenstock), at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/ 
1373/human_rights.html (last visited May 12, 2004).  Since this is the first offering 
on the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s webpage in its link to the subject of human 
rights and terrorism, one might reasonably conclude that the signal being overtly 
sent to member states seeking to comply with Resolution 1373 is that they do not 
have to worry much about compliance with human rights norms.  In a later meeting, 
however, Sir Jeremy apparently said that CTC is giving a prominent role to human 
rights, but the only reference available for this statement is found in a first-hand 
report of a special meeting where the comment was apparently made orally.  TASK 
FORCE ON TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 31.  The website remains unchanged.   
In January 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1456, which 
encouraged all states to follow Resolution 1373.  Buried in Resolution 1456 is the 
following admonition:  “States must ensure that any measure taken to combat 
terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt 
such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international 
human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”  S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. SCOR, 4688th 
meeting, S/RES/1456 (2003) at 6 available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/216/05/PDF/N0321605.pdf?OpenElement.  The UN 
Security Council apparently added this after successive UN High Commissioners for 
Human Rights had testified before them that more attention to human rights was 
urgent and necessary.  See United Nations, Office for the High Commission on 
Human Rights, Terrorism and Human Rights, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/terrorism/ (last visited June 19, 2004).  But Resolution 1456 is 
not brought under Chapter VII, and so it might justly be read as optional.    
 22. TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 34 n.30. 
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terrorism as a domestic threat because terrorism was, according 
to the EU’s structure of responsibilities, to be primarily regulated 
through each EU member state’s criminal law framework.23  
Criminal law is a “Justice and Home Affairs” responsibility, 
structured as the “third pillar” within the EU’s “three pillar” 
framework.24  As such, terrorism was not a subject for community 
lawmaking but could only be fought in EU terms within a 
framework of mutual agreement among member states.  After 
September 11, however, the EU moved to speed up cooperation 
and the creation of new institutional frameworks to deal with 
terrorism across all member states, giving a sharp push to 
further EU integration in this area. 
A special meeting of the General Affairs Council of Ministers 
was held on September 12, during which it “reaffirm[ed] its 
determination to combat all forms of terrorism with all the 
resources at its disposal.”25  The Council of Justice and Home 
Affairs Ministers, which met later that month, agreed on a 
variety of concrete proposals that would result in more 
coordination and cooperation between police and intelligence 
services throughout the EU.26  A month later, the General Affairs 
Council adopted an anti-terrorism “roadmap”27 that included a 
 
 23. In the one exception to this, in 1986, the European Community put into place 
a Counter-Terrorism Working Group called COTER.  This group was tasked with 
responsibilities under what later came to be known as the second pillar of the EU 
framework—foreign and security matters. These second-pillar efforts were also 
bolstered after 9/11.  See Monica den Boer, “9/11 and the Europeanization of Anti-
Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment.”  Notre Europe, Policy Paper #6, Sept. 2003, 
at 19 available at http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/fichiers/Policypaper6.pdf. 
 24. The EU’s increasing legal integration has taken place around a structure of 
three different sorts of understandings about the relationship between community 
and national law.  In “first pillar” areas like economic regulation, and other areas 
explicitly outlined by the set of treaties that make up EU law, EU law is superior to 
and binding on the member states and is enforceable by the European Court of 
Justice.  European Union, Structure of the European Union: The Three Pillars, at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/about/abc/abc_12.html (last visited May 12, 2004).  In 
the “second pillar” area of foreign and security policy, as well as in the “third pillar” 
area of justice and home affairs, the EU may only act by cooperation and consensus 
among all of the member states through their adjustments of national laws and 
policy.  Id. 
 25. Press Release, European Union, General Affairs Council (Sept. 12, 2001), at 
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?LANG=1. 
 26. See Conclusions Adopted by the Council (Justice and Home Affairs), 
September 20, 2001. Doc. SN 3926/6/01 REV 6. 
 27. Council of the European Union, Note From the Presidency, available at 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st12/12800-r1en1.pdf (last visited May 11, 
2004). 
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proposal for a European arrest warrant and the creation of 
Eurojust, an agency tasked with improving judicial and 
prosecutorial cooperation within the community.28  Though these 
proposals had been on the drawing board before September 11, 
the attacks in the United States hastened their passage from 
plan to reality.  Eurojust was authorized in February 2002,29 
adding judicial and prosecutorial coordination to the existing 
Europol policing power.  The pan-European arrest warrant was 
finalized in June 2002,30 despite substantial worries about the 
abolition of the prior rule of double criminality, which had limited 
extraditions within the EU to persons accused of actions defined 
as crimes in both the sending and receiving country.  The debates 
over the pan-European arrest warrant sharply focused attention 
on the differences among EU member states in their substantive 
criminal law.  Neither Eurojust nor the pan-European arrest 
warrant is limited to terrorism offenses, but their adoption 
occurred in the shadow of concern over terrorism. 
Perhaps the most significant step taken by the EU, 
specifically on the topic of terrorism, was the adoption in June 
2002 of a Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism.31  This 
provided a common definition of terrorist acts that member states 
were committed to adopting as part of their domestic, substantive 
criminal law.32  The structure of the terrorism definition in the 
Framework Decision bears strong resemblance to hate crime 
legislation; particular offenses can be punished more harshly if 
done with a particular motivation.33  The specific motivation to 
 
 28. Council of the European Union, Coordination of Implementation of the Plan of 
Action to Combat Terrorism, Doc. 12800/01 REV 1 (Oct. 17, 2001). 
 29. Council Decision Setting up Eurojust with a View to Reinforcing the Fight 
against Serious Crime, Doc. 2002/187/JHA (Feb. 28, 2002), available at 
http://www.eurojust.eu.int/pdfdec/l_06320020306en00010013.pdf (last visited June 
19, 2004).   
 30. Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the 
Surrender Procedures Between Member States, Doc. 2002/584/JHA (June 13, 2002), 
2002 O.J. (L 190) 45 [hereinafter Council Framework Decision], available at 
www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_190/l_19020020718en00010018.pdf 
(last visited May 13, 2004). 
 31. Council of the European Union, Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 
Doc. 2002/475/JHA, 2002 O.J. (L 164) (June 13, 2002) 3 [hereinafter Framework 
Decision on Combating Terrorism], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_164/l_16420020622en00030007.pdf (last visited June 19, 
2004). 
 32. Id. 
 33. The list of concrete actions that can constitute terrorism if done with the 
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intimidate a population, pressure a government or destabilize a 
country is what brings an ordinary criminal act into the realm of 
a terrorist offense.34  Here, too, the concern is over the breadth of 
the definition, particularly as terrorist actions have an 
irreducibly political quality, which they share with legitimate 
political dissent.  If, as the International Bar Association Task 
Force on Terrorism points out, a demonstrator burns a city bus as 
a way of making a political point about what the government 
should do, this could be considered a very serious terrorist offense 
punishable by a very harsh sentence.35  Alternatively, to continue 
the parade of worrying hypotheticals, someone who interrupts the 
process of fluoridating water to pressure the government to take 
the health risks of chemically treated water seriously might be in 
the same boat.  Setting fire to a flag to protest a government 
action could also be counted as a terrorist act, if the fire 
accidentally spread.  One can easily add to the examples where 
political dissent might cross over into being considered a terrorist 
offense, under the EU definition. 
Along with the redefinition of terrorism offenses, 
recommendations were made both for harsher punishments and 
for expansion of the set of potential terrorists to include terrorist 
groups, as well as individual terrorists.36  Punishment for 
terrorism offenses was also extended to those who incited, aided 
or abetted such crimes.  In addition, the Framework Decision 
created the category of a “terrorist-linked” offense that could also 
be punished as terrorism.37  These terrorist-linked offenses 
included aggravated theft, extortion and production of false 
documents to support a terrorist act.38 
 
appropriate motivation includes: attacks upon life or physical integrity; kidnapping 
or hostage taking; destroying government facilities, public facilities or transportation 
systems; seizing aircraft or other means of transportation; doing nearly anything 
with biological or chemical weapons; releasing dangerous substances into the 
environment or causing fires, floods or explosions; interfering with the supply of 
water or other public utilities or threatening to commit any of these acts.  Id. art. 
1(1). 
 34. The relevant motivation is defined as “seriously intimidating a population, or 
unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain 
from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental 
political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international 
organization.” Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, supra note 31, art. 1(1). 
 35. TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM, supra note 2, at 35. 
 36. Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, supra note 31, art. 2. 
 37. Id. art. 3.   
 38. Id. 
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The Framework Decision required all EU member states to 
pass legislation implementing its provisions within six months, so 
that all EU states, in theory, would have harmonious laws on the 
books by the end of 2002.39  To ensure continued compliance, the 
Council put into place a system for expert evaluation of the steps 
that member states were taking to comply with the Framework 
Decision.40 
September 11 seems to have sped up development, already 
in progress, toward a common policing and security policy across 
Europe.  With respect to terrorism offenses, one might say that 
September 11 created pressure for harmonization of domestic 
criminal law across the EU faster than previously thought 
possible. 
III.  EUROPEAN PATRIOT ACTS: GERMANY AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Operating under the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 
and the EU’s Framework Decision on Terrorism, how have 
individual European states dealt with the new urgency of a 
terrorist threat?  At a minimum, one might reasonably guess that 
both Security Council Resolution 1373 and the EU Council 
Framework Decision would require a fair amount of tinkering 
with domestic law, and tinker many countries did.41  After 
September 11, two new European national laws stand out.  A 
post-September 11 law was rushed through the British 
Parliament, even though a broad codification of its piecemeal 
anti-terrorism laws had been adopted a year earlier.42  Germany, 
which had numerous partial pre-September 11 anti-terrorism 
 
 39. Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, supra note 31, art. 11. 
 40. Council of the European Union, Council Decision Establishing a Mechanism 
for Evaluating the Legal Systems and their Implementation at National Level in the 
Fight Against Terrorism, Doc. 21715/02, 2002 O.J. (L 349) 1 (Oct. 11, 2002), available 
at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/st12/12715en2.pdf (last visited May 12, 
2004). 
 41. See, e.g., United Nations, Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 
(providing an explanation of the legislative actions taken in the British Parliament to 
address terrorism after September 11), available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/715/09/PDF/N0171509 (last visited May 13, 2004).  
Reports of other member states are available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/submitted_reports.html (last visited May 
13, 2004). 
 42. For a detailed guide to both laws, see CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO 
THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION (2002). 
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laws,43 adopted changes to both its criminal code and also to its 
investigative procedures shortly after September 11.44 
In reviewing European post-September 11 laws, this article 
focuses on Germany and the United Kingdom (UK).  These two 
countries have been chosen because they represent very different 
approaches to terrorism prevention.  Germany’s approach is 
highly formalized with many checks provided by both separation 
of powers and judicial review of rights violations.  Britain’s 
approach, however, is more casual and consensual.  Since its 
increasing integration into European institutions, the UK, 
however reluctantly, has been moving toward a more formal 
system for the protection of civil liberties.  Since Germany and 
Britain were the two European countries to rush to enact 
relatively broad terrorism laws after September 11, this also 
makes for a good comparison of alternatives. 
The consideration of these two frameworks will of necessity 
be only partial.  Just as it is difficult to work through the layers of 
secrecy in the United States to see how counter-terrorism policy 
works in practice, it is also difficult to see through the secrecy in 
the European processes around security issues to view how the 
laws on the books are carried out in practice.  But, as in the 
United States, it is possible to review the legal framework 
regulating such processes, which themselves reveal a great deal 
about a country’s strategy for fighting terrorism. 
A.  GERMANY 
Given Germany’s past history of aggression against its 
neighbors and its massive violations of human rights against 
targeted populations in the first half of the twentieth century, the 
German Basic Law (Constitution) of 1949 instituted a number of 
serious safeguards both against militarism and against the 
danger of human rights violations.  The new constitution was to 
prevent such things from ever happening again.45  As a result, the 
 
 43. For an account in English of the relevant anti-terrorism legislation in 
Germany before September 11, see James I. Nelson, Antiterrorismus: The German 
Experience with Politically Motivated Violence, 20 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 563 (2002). 
 44. See Oliver Lepsius, The Relationship Between Security and Civil Liberties in 
the Federal Republic of Germany After September 11 (Am. Inst. for Contemporary 
German Studies Working Paper 2002) (discussing German Counter-Terrorism 
legislation and the balance between security and liberty after September 11), 
available at http://www.aicgs.org/publications/PDF/lepsiusenglish.pdf. 
 45. The Preamble to the Basic Law indicates this renunciation of the past:  
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German constitutional order has an unusually large number of 
checks on concentrations of power as well as avenues for 
complaint about the violations of human rights in conjunction 
with policing, security, and defense matters.46 
First, the German Basic Law renounces aggressive military 
action against other states and indicates that actions leading to 
war must be criminalized.47  Instead, principles of international 
law are automatically incorporated as federal law, superior to 
statutes, directly creating both rights and duties for inhabitants 
of Germany.48  This incorporation of international law 
constitutionalizes the right for all those residing in Germany to 
appeal to international bodies, particularly the European Court of 
Human Rights, for redress of human rights infringements, 
presumably even in a time of crisis. 
When it comes to crises, the German Basic Law, through 
amendment in 1968, adopted explicit textual guidance for what 
could and could not be done in “states of defense.”49  In the public 
 
“Conscious of their responsibility before God and men, moved by the purpose to serve 
world peace as an equal part in a unified Europe, the German People have adopted, 
by virtue of their constituent power, this Constitution.” 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] translated in THE BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ) 
(Axel Tschentscher trans., 2002) available at http://www.jurisprudentia.de/ 
jurisprudentia.html. 
 46. See infra notes 47-87. 
 47. Article 26 [Ban on War] 
(1) Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations 
between nations, especially to prepare war or aggression, are unconstitutional. 
They have to be made a criminal offence. 
Id. art. 26(1), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 31. 
 48. Article 25 [Public International Law]  
The general rules of public international law constitute an integral part of 
federal law. They take precedence over statutes and directly create rights and 
duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.  
Id. art. 25, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 31.  Note that this 
protection applies to all residents, not just citizens. 
 49. Article 80a [State of Defence] 
(1) Where this Constitution or a federal statute on defence, including the 
protection of the civilian population, stipulates that legal provisions may only be 
applied in accordance with this Article, their application is, except in a state of 
defence, admissible only after the House of Representatives [Bundestag] has 
determined that a state of tension exists or where it has specifically approved 
such application. In respect of the cases mentioned in Article 12a V 1 & VI 2, 
such determination of a state of tension and such specific approval requires a 
two-thirds majority of the votes cast.  
(2) Any measures taken by virtue of legal provisions enacted under Paragraph I 
have to be revoked whenever the House of Representatives [Bundestag] so 
demands.  
(3) In derogation of Paragraph I, the application of such legal provisions is also 
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debates surrounding the adoption of these amendments, the 
“trauma of Weimar”50 was ever-present, since the Weimar 
Constitution’s infamous Article 48 detailing a constitutional 
procedure for a state of emergency had assisted the dissolution of 
the constitution in 1933 and permitted the rise of Nazi 
government.51  As a result, the present Basic Law requires 
approval of both houses of Parliament for the declaration and 
maintenance of states of defense, taking such discretion out of the 
hands of the executive.52  If the Parliament cannot meet, a joint 
 
admissible by virtue of and in accordance with a decision taken with the consent 
of the Government by an international body within the framework of a treaty of 
alliance. Any measures taken pursuant to this paragraph have to be revoked 
whenever the House of Representatives [Bundestag] so demands with the 
majority of its members.  
Id. art. 80a, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 88-93. 
Article 115g [Functions of Federal Constitutional Court] 
The constitutional status and the performance of the constitutional functions of 
the Federal Constitutional Court and its judges may not be impaired.  The 
Federal Constitutional Court Act may not be amended by a statute enacted by 
the Joint Committee except insofar as such amendment is required, also in the 
opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court, to maintain the capability of the 
Court to function. Pending the enactment of such a statute, the Federal 
Constitutional Court may take such measures as are necessary to maintain the 
capability of the Court to carry out its work.  Any decisions by the Federal 
Constitutional Court in pursuance of the second and third sentence of this 
Article requires a two-thirds majority of the judges present.  
Id. art. 115g, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 59-60.   
A number of the permissible limitations on rights that are later discussed were also 
part of the 1968 amendments.  It may be useful in the present context to note that 
1968 was a year of substantial domestic upheaval in Germany and the amendments 
were immensely controversial when they were adopted.  However, the major 
domestic terrorism campaigns in Germany by the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red 
Army Brigades did not start until 1970. 
 50. C. C. Schweitzer, Emergency Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 22 
W. POL. Q. 112, 113 (1969). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Article 115a [State of Defence] 
(1) The determination that federal territory is being attacked by armed force or 
that such an attack is directly imminent (state of defence) are made by the 
House of Representatives [Bundestag] with the consent of the Senate 
[Bundesrat].  Such determination are made at the request of the Government 
and require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which include at least the 
majority of the members of the House of Representatives [Bundestag].  
(2) Where the situation imperatively calls for immediate action and where 
insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely assembly of the House of 
Representatives [Bundestag], or where there is no quorum in the House of 
Representatives [Bundestag], the Joint Committee makes this determination 
with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which includes at least the majority 
of its members.  
(3) The determination is promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette by the 
President pursuant to Article 82.  Where this cannot be done in time, the 
promulgation is effected in another manner; subsequently, it has to be printed in 
the Federal Law Gazette as soon as circumstances permit.  
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committee of members of both chambers can perform the 
functions that would normally be performed by the whole of each 
body, but the executive cannot act alone. 53 
In addition to the substantial protections against arbitrarily 
declared or executive-dominated states of defense, the German 
Basic Law is unusually precise in indicating what can and cannot 
be done domestically in the name of national defense with respect 
to infringement on fundamental rights.  For example, Article 
17(a) of the Basic Law indicates that statutes enacted for national 
defense in order to protect the population may place limited 
restrictions on two of the fundamental rights—that of freedom of 
movement (Article 11) and inviolability of the home (Article 13).54  
Through this precise accounting, it is clear that other basic rights 
cannot be restricted in exceptional ways even in the name of 
national defense.55  As part of the constitutional elaboration of the 
 
(4) Where the federal territory is being attacked by armed force and where the 
competent bodies of the Federation are not in a position at once to make the 
determination provided for in Paragraph 1, such determination is deemed to 
have been made and promulgated at the time the attack began.  The President 
announces such time as soon as circumstances permit.  
(5) Where the determination of the existence of a state of defence has been 
promulgated and where the federal territory is being attacked by armed force, 
the President may, with the consent of the House of Representatives 
[Bundestag], issue declarations under international law regarding the existence 
of such state of defence. Where the conditions mentioned in Paragraph 2 apply, 
the Joint Committee acts in substitution for the House of Representatives 
[Bundestag].  
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 115a (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, 
supra note 45, at 90-91. 
 53. Id. art. 115(a)(2).   
 54. Article 17a(2): “Statutes serving defence purposes including the protection of 
the civilian population can provide for the restriction of the basic rights of freedom of 
movement (Article 11) and inviolability of the home (Article 13).” 
Id. art. 17a(2), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 26-27. 
 55. Article 19 of the Basic Law governs how rights may be limited in normal 
times.  Judicial review is always available to determine whether rights have been 
limited in appropriate ways, save in cases of alleged violation of the right of privacy 
of communication, which substitutes a form of parliamentary review for the usual 
judicial review.   
Article 19 [Restriction of Basic Rights]  
(1) Insofar as a basic right may, under this Constitution, be restricted by or 
pursuant to a statute, such statute must apply generally and not solely to an 
individual case.  Furthermore, such statute must name the basic right, 
indicating the relevant Article.  
(2) In no case may the essence of a basic right be infringed.  
(3) Basic rights also apply to domestic corporations to the extent that the nature 
of such rights permits.  
(4) Should any personʹs rights be violated by public authority, recourse to the 
court is open to him. Insofar as no other jurisdiction has been established, 
recourse is available to the courts of ordinary jurisdiction. Article 10(2) is not 
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state of defense under Article 115, the Basic Law is explicit that 
the Constitutional Court must remain open and functional during 
the crisis.56 
This three-part structure—renouncing war while adopting 
international law, providing substantial separation-of-powers 
barriers against arbitrariness and executive overreaching in 
declaring domestic states of defense, and protecting individual 
rights during states of crisis—has strong implications for anti-
terrorism activities.  It tends to channel anti-terrorism measures 
from a war footing to a criminal-law footing because the defense-
based measures are nearly impossible to invoke.  Thinking of the 
anti-terrorism campaign after September 11 as a “war” was 
simply not an obvious constitutional possibility.57 
As a result, anti-terrorism campaigns have been handled 
largely through criminal law and criminal procedure.  But if one 
goes looking through the Basic Law for the constitutional anchor 
for specific rights of criminal defendants, one will find few.  
Specifically, constitutional provisions regarding judicial review of 
arrests and detention can be found in Article 104, which indicates 
that those detained must be brought before a judge before the end 
of the day after detention, if the arrest is made without prior 
warrant or provisionally on “suspicion of [the individual] having 
committed an offense.”58  No detention can be continued without 
 
affected by the provisions of this paragraph. 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 115g (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, 
supra note 45, at 31.   
 56. Id. art. 115g, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 93. 
 57. As Oliver Lepsius explains,  “In Germany, the attacks [of September 11] were 
perceived as a qualitatively new type of an act of terrorism, not as an act of war.  For 
Germans a dividing line between terrorism and war was maintained.”  Lepsius, 
supra note 44, at *6. 
 58. Article 104 [Legal Guarantees to Protect Liberty]  
(1) The liberty of the individual may be restricted only by virtue of a formal 
statute and only in compliance with the forms prescribed therein.  Detained 
persons may not be subjected to mental or to physical ill-treatment.  
(2) Only judges may decide on the admissibility or continuation of any 
deprivation of liberty.  Where such deprivation is not based on the order of a 
judge, a judicial decision has to be obtained without delay. The police may hold 
no one on their own authority in their own custody longer than the end of the 
day after the day of apprehension.  Details are regulated by legislation.  
(3) Any person provisionally detained on suspicion of having committed an 
offence has to be brought, not later than the day following the day of 
apprehension, before a judge who has to inform him of the reasons for the 
detention, examine him, and give him an opportunity to raise objections.  The 
judge, without delay, has to either issue a warrant of arrest setting forth the 
reasons therefor or order his release from detention.  
(4) A relative or a person enjoying the confidence of the person detained has to 
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judicial approval and no detention can be effected at all unless 
pursuant to a properly enacted statute.59  Additionally, no 
detainee may be subjected to either mental or physical abuse.60  
Beyond these provisions, the constitution says little about the 
rights of criminal suspects.61  However, this is only the surface of 
the Basic Law. 
Instead of including rights like the presumption of innocence 
and the right to counsel in the Basic Law, the German Code of 
Criminal Procedure regulates such things.62  The Code, however, 
is considered to be the “constitutionalization” of this area of law 
since both the rule-of-law clause and the fundamental rights 
listed in the Basic Law permeate the Code.63  Behind the Code is a 
constitutionally required respect for basic principles of the 
fundamental rights, such as the principle that human dignity is 
inviolable and without limitation.64  Fundamental rights do not 
altogether block investigative methods or surveillance, but they 
greatly limit the extent to which such methods can be used.  For 
example, the protection of liberty65 and privacy of 
 
be notified without delay of any judicial decision imposing or ordering the 
continuation of his deprivation of liberty.  
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 104 (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 
78-79.   
 59. Id.   
 60. Id.  
 61. Article 103 of the Basic Law protects due process, including the right to a 
hearing, the right not to be tried twice for the same offense and the right to be tried 
only for criminal offenses defined as such when the act in question was committed: 
Article 103 [Due Process]  
(1) In the courts, everyone is entitled to a hearing in accordance with the law.  
(2) An act can be punished only where it constituted a criminal offence under the 
law before the act was committed.  
(3) No one may be punished for the same act more than once under general 
criminal legislation.  
Id. art. 103, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 78.   
 62. An English translation of the German Code of Criminal Procedure can be 
found at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StPO.htm (last visited June 19, 2004). 
 63. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 814 n.29 (2000). 
 64. Article 1 [Human Dignity]  
(1) Human dignity is inviolable.  To respect and protect it is the duty of all state 
authority.  
(2) The German People therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human 
rights as the basis of every human community, of peace, and of justice in the 
world.  
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 1 (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 
18. 
 65. Article 2 [Liberty]  
(1) Everyone has the right to free development of his personality insofar as he 
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communications66 are to be read throughout the criminal 
procedure code as substantial barriers on police and prosecutorial 
activity.  When any right is infringed, the Basic Law requires 
that such infringement never touch the “essence” of the right.67  
However, in the case of privacy of communications in Article 10, 
there was a lively debate as to whether constitutional 
amendments made in 1968 themselves infringed the essence of 
the right.  The 1968 amendments allowed infringement on 
privacy of communications if the restriction “serves the protection 
of the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of 
the Federation . . . .”68  Moreover, the amendment substituted 
parliamentary oversight for judicial review to rule on cases of 
individual violation.69  The result was the creation of Article 10 
review bodies, which is further discussed below.70 
This limitation on privacy of communications is 
uncharacteristically broad and vague in the German 
constitutional scheme of things.  The amendment was therefore 
itself constitutionally challenged before the Federal 
Constitutional Court in the Klass case.71  Because of this 
extraordinary limitation on a constitutionally protected right and 
the fact that judicial review of violations of the right was to be 
barred in these cases, the dissenting judges were willing to 
 
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or 
morality.  
(2) Everyone has the right to life and to physical integrity. The freedom of the 
person is inviolable.  Intrusion on these rights may only be made pursuant to a 
statute.  
Id. art. 2, translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 18. 
 66. Article 10 [Letters, Mail, Telecommunication]  
(1) The privacy of letters as well as the secrecy of post and telecommunication 
are inviolable.  
(2) Restrictions may only be ordered pursuant to a statute. Where a restriction 
serves the protection of the free democratic basic order or the existence or 
security of the Federation or a State [Land], the statute may stipulate that the 
person affected shall not be informed and that recourse to the courts shall be 
replaced by a review of the case by bodies and auxiliary bodies appointed by 
Parliament. 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 10 (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, 
supra note 45, at 21. 
 67. Id. art. 19(2), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 27. 
 68. Id. art. 10(2), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 21. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text. 
 71. The Klass Case, Judgment of 15 December 1970, BVerfGE 30, 1.  An edited 
English translation can be found at Privacy of Communications (Klass) case, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 660 (Walter F. 
Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus trans. & eds., 1977). 
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declare that the constitutional amendment allowing infringement 
of the privacy of communications was itself unconstitutional.72 
The majority, however, was evidently persuaded to uphold the 
amendment against the challenge on the grounds that the 
Parliament had at least substituted a form of individualized 
parliamentary review for judicial review.73  The majority  rejected 
the part of the statute that prohibited notification of the target of 
the surveillance after the surveillance was completed, indicating 
that a targeted person had to be informed of such surveillance, 
otherwise the right to challenge it would effectively be taken 
away.74  It seems that the idea that a constitutional amendment 
could be unconstitutional was too radical for the majority.  This 
decision was followed by a confirming ruling from European 
Court of Human Rights, reaching the same conclusion that the 
parliamentary mechanisms were enough to ensure the realization 
of the right to privacy.75  The European Court of Human Rights, 
however, expressed some concern that judicial review had been 
expressly blocked in this area. 
The amendment to Article 10 of the Basic Law later 
produced another Constitutional Court challenge.  This time the 
challenged practices related to “strategic surveillance” of wireless 
communications.76  In American terms, strategic surveillance 
would be called signals intercepts, and it would, as in Germany, 
be used for the more diffuse purpose of national security 
protection, rather than for the more concrete search for evidence 
of crime.77  In Germany, the challenged form of surveillance 
involved computer screening of international communications to 
determine whether certain key words or phrases appeared in 
these communications.  If such clues appeared, then individually 
identifiable communications might be subjected to human review.  
If evidence of a crime were found through such surveillance, it 
could be turned over to the relevant state agencies for further 
 
 72. The Klass Case, BVerfGE 30, 1.  See infra notes 303-08 for further discussion 
of the Klass case.   
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Klass v. Germany, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 (1979). 
 76. The Case of Professor Dr. K, Judgment of 14 July 1999, BVerfGE 100, 317, 
translation of the Federal Constitutional Court.  I would like to thank Russell Miller 
for providing me with this translation of the decision. 
 77. See generally for the United States, William C. Banks and M.E. Bowman, 
Executive Authority For National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7-10 
(2000). 
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action even though the procedures through which the evidence 
was gathered in the first place involved no individuated suspicion 
that the target of the surveillance had done anything wrong 
before the surveillance was undertaken.  Strategic surveillance, 
according to the Federal Constitutional Court, was permissible in 
theory, but the state had to take more measures than it presently 
had to ensure that data collection, transfer, and retention of 
individually identifiable information were kept to a minimum.  
Such measures also had to be continually reviewed so that they 
remained narrowly tailored to achieve the legitimate statutory 
objectives of the security agencies and of any other state agencies 
to which individually identifiable information might be passed 
on.78  Restrictions on the right to privacy of communications 
guaranteed in the Basic Law were only permissible if they were 
proportional to the objectives, a balance which, the court said, the 
challenged law had not struck properly because it allowed the 
relatively easy distribution of personally identifiable information 
for a wide variety of purposes.79  Either the Parliament had to 
restrict the range of purposes for which the data could be used if 
the data transfers were to be as easy as they were in the 
challenged law, the court said, or the data transfers had to be 
made much more difficult to accomplish if the purposes for which 
the data could be used were of such great breadth.  Consequently, 
the court declared parts of the surveillance law to be 
unconstitutional.80 
In another area where fundamental rights might bear on 
criminal investigation and surveillance, Article 13(1) says plainly, 
“The home is inviolable.”81  In 1998, this article of the Basic Law 
was amended to allow electronic bugging of a home, but only 
under highly restricted circumstances.82  The amendment, now 
Article 13(2)-(7), indicates that surveillance inside a home might 
be undertaken only “If specific facts lead to the assumption that 
 
 78. The Case of Professor Dr. K, BVerfGE 100, 317, supra note 76.   
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Article 13(1): “The home is inviolable.” 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 13(1) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, 
at 23. 
 82. Article 13(2): “Searches may be ordered only by a judge or, in the event of 
danger resulting from any delay, by other organs legally specified, and they may be 
carried out only in the form prescribed by law.”  
Id. art. 13(2), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 23. 
SCHEPPELE-12-FI-RSB 6/25/2004  5:29 PM 
2004] Other People’s PATRIOT Acts 107 
someone has committed a very grave crime.”83  Furthermore, 
surveillance may be conducted only on the order of a three-judge 
panel for a limited duration upon the showing that other methods 
of discovering the information are unlikely to be successful.84  
However, in an urgent situation, a single judge may approve such 
an order.85  Information gained through such surveillance may 
only be used “to conduct criminal prosecution or to avoid danger, 
and only if the legality of the measure has been stated by court 
order.”86  Before 1998, bugging of a home was considered to be a 
violation of Article 13 and, at least according to one judge, “judges 
were not competent to authorize such investigative measures.  
And, self-evidently, the police and the public prosecutor were 
thus not allowed to implement them.  Our [German] criminal 
prosecution authorities have obeyed this.”87 
The German Constitution guarantees judicial review of all 
alleged rights violations with the exception of those specifically 
exempted in the amendment to Article 10.88  The aggressive 
protection of basic rights, which has been exercised by the 
Federal Constitutional Court in particular, has had a strong 
 
 83. Article 13(3):  
If specific facts lead to the assumption that someone has committed a very grave 
crime, technical means of eavesdropping in homes where that person probably 
stays may be ordered by court if the investigation by other means would be 
unproportionally obstructed or without chance of success. The measure has to be 
limited. The order is issued by a court of three justices.  In the event of danger 
resulting from any delay, the order can be issued by a single judge.  
Id. art. 13(3), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 23-24. 
 84. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 13(3) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra 
note 45, at 23. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Article 13(5):  
In the case of technical means being exclusively ordered for the protection of 
investigators during their activity in homes, the measure can be ordered by 
those authorities empowered by law.  Evidence from such investigation may be 
used for other purposes only to conduct criminal prosecution or avoid danger and 
only if the legality of the measure has been stated by court order; in the event of 
danger resulting form any delay, a subsequent court order has to be arranged for 
without delay.  
Id. art. 13(5), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 24. 
 87. Volker F. Krey, Characteristic Features of German Criminal Proceedings—An 
Alternative to the Criminal Procedure Law of the United States?, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 591, 594 (1999).  Volker F. Krey served on the German Court of Appeals 
from 1978 to 1998.  Id. at 591 n.1.  A later Constitutional Court decision indicates 
that judges still find such methods constitutionally problematic, even with the 
constitutional amendment.  See infra note 149. 
 88. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 19(4) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra 
note 55, at 27.  For the amendments to art. 10, see THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 
21. 
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effect on other public institutions. 
In light of these strong constitutional commitments, both to 
anti-militarism and to human rights, how can Germany defend 
itself, either against crime of the ordinary sort or against 
terrorism on a grander scale?  The first line of defense is through 
the ordinary police who, in the scheme of German federalism, 
tend to be strongest at the state (Land) level because they have 
the capacity to enforce not only state law, but federal law as 
well.89  While there is a Federal Criminal Police Office (the 
Bundeskriminalamt or BKA), it is relatively weaker than the 
American FBI.  The BKA is limited to: (1) matters that cross the 
borders of states and that therefore cannot be controlled by the 
state-level police alone and (2) investigation of international 
crimes over which the separate states have no jurisdiction.90  As 
we have already seen, the constitutionalized Code of Criminal 
Procedure contains relatively strict regulation of police conduct in 
investigations. 
Germany has three major intelligence services, though with 
the end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany some 
have challenged the need to have intelligence institutions at all.91  
The intelligence services are not only institutionally separated 
from the police and from each other, but they are also physically 
separated in different cities as well.92  The attacks of September 
 
 89. See Nelson, supra note 43, at 577-79 (providing an overview of the German 
agencies charged with fighting terrorism). 
 90. Id. at 578-79. 
 91. Shlomo Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in 
Germany, in DEMOCRACY, LAW AND SECURITY: INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES IN 
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE 294, 295 (Jean-Paul Brodeur et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in Germany]. 
 92. One of the interesting aspects of German separation of powers, copied by a 
number of countries, is that institutional separation of powers is often accompanied 
by physical separation of the institutions in different geographical locations.  This 
means that the occupants of the various offices tend not to socialize with each other, 
which increases the institutional separation.  As Jane Kramer, writing in the New 
Yorker, states: 
In a country still so nervous about displays of power that it is considered 
unseemly even to talk about turning Berlin’s Philharmonic into a national 
orchestra, it isn’t surprising that most of the people charged with identifying, 
investigating, arresting, and prosecuting terrorists don’t usually get anywhere 
near the capital, or even anywhere near one another. Germany has as many 
spies and cops as the next country. Eight thousand people are attached to the 
Verfassungsschutz and the B.N.D., five thousand to the B.K.A.  But the old 
Allied imperative of 1949—power in Germany must never again be 
centralized—still holds. The Verfassungsschutz is headquartered in Cologne; 
the B.N.D. in Pullach, about half an hour from Munich; the Federal Prosecutor 
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11 resulted in some expansion of their previous powers, but by 
and large the basic structure of the intelligence services remains 
the same. 
The Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst 
or BND) is tasked with collecting and analyzing security-related 
information originating outside Germany, including signals 
intelligence.93  It is institutionally housed in the Office of the 
Federal Chancellor and is physically located just outside of 
Munich.94  The BND has no domestic jurisdiction.  The Military 
Counter-Intelligence Branch (Militaerischer Abschirmdienst or 
MAD) deals with security issues within the military and has no 
civilian jurisdiction.95  Therefore, the institution of most interest 
to us in considering investigation and surveillance within 
Germany is the domestic security service, named appropriately 
enough, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Bundesamt für Verfassungschutz or BfV).  The BfV is 
responsible for counter-espionage activities within Germany and 
is also supposed to monitor a wide variety of domestically based 
extremist groups.96  It is institutionally housed within the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior and is physically based in Cologne.97  It 
works with counterparts at the state level, but the federal level is 
by far the more powerful. 
The BfV’s statutory mandate is explicit and limited.98  The 
office carries out its investigations primarily through the use of 
publicly available documents and methods available to all (for 
example, attending public meetings, reading newspapers, 
carrying out surveillance of subjects in public places or through 
 
in Karlsruhe; the B.K.A. in Wiesbaden; and the state security offices of the 
B.K.A. in a town called Meckenheim, in North Rhine-Westphalia, which most 
Germans have yet to locate on a map. 
Jane Kramer, Letter from Europe: Germany’s Troubled War on Terrorism, NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 11, 2002, at 36. 
 93. See Shlomo Shpiro, Parliamentary and Administrative Reforms in the Control 
of Intelligence Services in the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 545, 550-51 
(1998) [hereinafter Shpiro, Parliamentary and Administrative Reforms] (discussing 
the structure of the German Intelligence Service). 
 94. Id. at 551. 
 95. Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in 
Germany, supra note 91, at 296. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. [Federal Constitution Protection Law] (BVerfSchG), v. 20.12.1990 (BGB1. I S. 
867), translation available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/germany/docs/bverfg.htm 
(last visited May 12, 2004). 
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voluntary interviews).  The organization may also use agents to 
infiltrate groups, engage in postal checks or electronic 
surveillance (subject to the procedures of Article 10 of the 
constitution, elaborated below) and use secret photography.99  
However, the BfV does not “carry out any executive measures 
(arrests, search of premises, interrogations, confiscation of items).  
If the BfV establishes that judicial and police measures are 
required, the matter is handed over to agencies with appropriate 
legal powers (the courts, public prosecutors, police) which decide 
independently what action is justified.”100 
This organization of intelligence agencies has a substantial 
system of parliamentary checks, even though the agencies 
themselves are located within the executive branch.  The 
Parliamentary Control Commission consists of nine members 
from the lower house of the parliament, five elected from within 
the governing coalition, and four elected from the opposition.101  
The chairmanship of the committee rotates at six month intervals 
between the government and opposition parties.102  The 
government must report all intelligence activities to this 
committee which must itself report to the Bundestag once every 
two years.103  The committee has access to a substantial amount of 
classified information that is excised from its required public 
reports. 
In addition to the Parliamentary Control Commission, there 
are two committees that were required under the controversial 
amendments to Article 10 of the Constitution, which protects 
privacy of communications.  These committees review 
surveillance practices of both the intelligence services and the 
police.  The G-10 Gremium (named in honor of Article 10 of the 
Constitution) consists of nine members of the Bundestag.  It 
meets every six months to review and direct general policies 
about interception of mail, wiretaps and other forms of electronic 
intercepts.104  The G-10 Commission consists of four legal experts 
 
 99. [Federal Constitution Protection Law] (BVerfSchG), supra note 98. 
 100. Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Tasks, Organization and Working 
Methods, at http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/info/bfv/bfv_engl.htm (last visited May 
12, 2004). 
 101. Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in 
Germany, supra note 91, at 298. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 300. 
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(and four alternates) who are nominated by their political parties 
and meet together with representatives from the intelligence 
services about once per month.105  This group reviews the legality 
of each domestic communications intercept and has the right to 
suspend any individual intercept if it appears that the evidence 
sustaining it is weak or if the intercept infringes any law.106  The 
committee even reviews the list of “hit words” that computers use 
in strategic surveillance to determine which specific 
conversations to turn over for human attention.107  In addition to 
these ways of reviewing surveillance strategies, there is also the 
permanent possibility for the Parliament to set up a special 
investigating committee if any particular surveillance practice 
generates concern.108 
Outside of the parliamentary mechanisms, the press in 
Germany enjoys substantial constitutional and statutory 
protection to investigate intelligence and policing practices.  Not 
only is press freedom guaranteed in the Constitution,109 but there 
is an explicit constitutional prohibition on censorship.110  By 
statute, the press is guaranteed confidentiality of sources and 
informants, as well as immunity from police eavesdropping and 
searches of editorial offices.111  As a result, media coverage of the 
police and intelligence services is quite common, detailed, and 
critical.  And because the intelligence services have not been 
scandal-free, this media check has been quite useful.112 
With this background, we can assess the changes made to 
Germany’s security laws after September 11.  The “first security 
 
 105. Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in 
Germany, supra note 91, at 301. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 301-02. 
 108. Two separate parliamentary committees are charged with overseeing the 
budgets of the intelligence agencies, and the books of the agencies can be reviewed as 
well by a select group within the Federal Audit Office.  Id. at 302-04. 
 109. Article 5 [Expression]  
(1) Everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate his opinion in 
speech, writing, and pictures and to freely inform himself from generally 
accessible sources.  Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of 
broadcasts and films are guaranteed.  There may be no censorship.  
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 5(1) (F.R.G.), translated in THE BASIC LAW, supra note 45, at 
19. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Shpiro, Parliament, Media and Control of the Intelligence Services in 
Germany, supra note 91, at 306. 
 112. Id. at 305-08. 
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package,” sent to the parliament by the German cabinet on 
September 19, 2001, modified the criminal code, among other 
things.113  The criminal code was amended to punish creation of 
terrorist organizations, including foreign organizations for the 
first time.  The amendments also forbid any participation in a 
criminal organization on German territory, even if the planned 
criminal acts were to take place outside of Germany.114  In 
addition, the first security package eliminated the previous 
exemption from criminal prosecution of extremist organizations 
that had a religious basis.115  Now extremist religious 
organizations can be prohibited on the same basis as other 
extremist groups.  Finally, the first security package increased 
security checks for airport personnel.116  Most of these provisions 
were uncontroversial when passed and, coming as they did before 
either Security Council Resolution 1373 or the European 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, they could be 
explicit responses to neither of them. 
It is the “second security package” that should interest us 
because its provisions were primarily directed at the earlier 
detection of terrorist threats.117  And the second security package 
was by far the more controversial in Germany.118  Most of the 
provisions seem to have been a response to the UN Security 
Council resolution, something that can be seen not only from 
their concrete content, but because they came into effect on  
January 1, 2002, the deadline set out in the Security Council 
resolution.  But the provisions passed only after fierce 
parliamentary debate that resulted in a weakening of a number 
of its central provisions.  Even so, the second security package 
amended “nearly one hundred regulations in seventeen different 
statutes and five statutory orders.”119 
The main provisions of the second security package 
increased the responsibilities and powers of the security agencies.  
 
 113. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *5. 
 114. Id.  This last addition simply brought the German criminal code into line with 
what EU member states had obliged themselves to do by an agreement in December 
1998.  Id. 
 115. Id. at *6. 
 116. Id. at *5-6. 
 117. Id. at *6, *10-17.  The “‘second security package’ has also been termed the 
counter-terrorism law.”  Id. at *10. 
 118. See Lepsius, supra note 44, at *6. 
 119. Id. at *6. 
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The BfV, the BND,120 and the MAD121 were given the power to 
demand financial information about individuals from banks and 
other financial institutions, as well as from post offices, 
telecommunications companies and airlines, after having proved 
to a court the specific suspicion of terrorist activity that grounded 
the request.122  Those whose information has been turned over to 
the security authorities must not be notified that this exchange of 
data has occurred.123  In addition, the BfV’s jurisdiction was 
enlarged to enable it to gather information on organizations and 
individuals who “disturb the international understanding or 
peaceful cohabitation of peoples,” the first time that the BfV had 
been given authority to investigate anything other than purely 
domestic organizations.124  The various federal agencies 
responsible for tracking foreigners were given more powers to set 
up a central database containing a variety of personal 
information, including fingerprints, religious identification and 
the results of “language identity tests” designed to uncover the 
country of origin of an alien.125  Police and security agencies were 
then given relatively unfettered access to this database.  “Grid 
searches”126 (or what Americans might call computer profiles) 
were given statutory approval and some government ministries 
with relevant personal information in their files were required to 
 
 120. Because the BND’s jurisdiction is entirely focused on foreigners, this provision 
has to be intended to allow the BND access to information that is held within 
Germany about foreigners (for example, their bank accounts). 
 121. MAD’s jurisdiction extends only to those in the military, so this information 
could pertain only to those within its ambit. 
 122. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *10-11. 
 123. Id. at *11. 
 124. Id. at *12. 
 125. Id. at *11. 
 126. Grid searches try to narrow down a group of suspects from a variety of 
demographic and personal data—say, on religion, age, sex, area of residence and 
immigration status.  The objection to them typically is that someone falls into the 
category of suspicion not because of a reason that is particular to the person, but 
instead because that person shares with those who might be reasonably suspected a 
certain abstract characteristic.  The Federal Constitutional Court, in the Case of 
Professor Dr. K, Judgment of 14 July 1999, BVerfGE 100, 313, discussed the problem 
of individuated suspicion and indicated that the standards for disseminating, storing 
and using information obtained in such a way had to be higher than if the 
information had been collected based on individuated suspicion.  But the Court did 
not shut the door on such practices so it is unclear whether the Court would find grid 
searches similarly acceptable, if used within clear limits.  A translation of the case is 
on file with the Loyola Law Review.  See also Lepsius, supra note 44, at *15 
(discussing the Court’s decision). 
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give this information to the BKA.127  New identity cards for 
Germans are now authorized to include biometric data like 
fingerprints.128  The second security package also authorized both 
greater protection of sensitive sites like power stations and the 
use of air marshals in airline security.129 
The constitutional and rights-protection worries about the 
second security package center on three concerns.  The first worry 
is the increased coordination allowed between the security 
services and the police, though this is limited to information-
sharing based on strong showings of relevance to particular 
investigations and is not a blanket approval of anything like joint 
investigations.130  This level of information-sharing was clearly 
encouraged both by the Security Council resolution and by the 
European Union anti-terrorism measures taken after September 
11. Both sets of external measures encouraged the increase 
information-sharing across state borders so that security services 
and police would have access to terrorism-relevant information.131  
Much criticism of the second security package focuses on the way 
in which this information-sharing undermines the strict 
separation of security and police agencies, which had been 
characteristic of post-war German public law.132 
The first worry is connected to a second—that the 
information collected in terrorism investigations can be stored for 
longer periods of time in databases with broader rules of access 
than has been customarily allowed in German law.  European 
data privacy laws in general, and German laws in particular, 
confer protection far greater than anything Americans may 
expect on personal data, and the idea that personal information 
may be collected and stored for a period of months without an 
 
 127. Grid searches had been used to apprehend members of the Red Army Faction, 
a domestic terrorist group operating in Germany in the 1970s.  While this practice 
was used on occasion before the second security package, the legitimacy of grid 
searches had not been definitively established.  See Klaus Jansen, Fighting Terror in 
Germany (Am. Inst. for Contemporary German Studies Working Paper 2003) 
(discussing the German legal framework in Germany with reference to terrorism), 
available at http://www.aicgs.org/publications/PDF/jansen.pdf (last visited May 13, 
2004). 
 128. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *7. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at *9-10.  
 131. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 11; Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 
supra note 31. 
 132. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *10. 
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individual’s knowledge sets off alarm bells in a privacy-sensitive 
public.  In addition to lowering barriers between police and 
security agencies, data storage also represents an independent 
intrusion into the privacy of individual life.  But these provisions 
also were responses to both Security Council and EU instructions, 
which saw database improvement as an important way to combat 
terrorism.133 
Finally, there is a concern over the “de-individuation” of 
suspicion.134  German criminal procedure has typically required 
that information collection about particular suspects as well as 
their arrest and detention rely solely on reasonable suspicion that 
can be tied to incriminating evidence about that person in 
particular.135  The codification of grid searches and the 
criminalization of mere membership in terrorist organizations 
appears to weaken this requirement that proof be obtained in an 
individualized way.  To the critics, mere association or the 
coincidence of correlating characteristics with terrorists appears 
now to be sufficient for the authorities to open a dossier and to 
eventually arrest and detain a suspect.136  This is a tremendous 
cause for concern in Germany which has generally required high 
and individuated standards of proof before surveillance or 
investigations can be undertaken. 
Still, in international comparison, the changes made by the 
post-September 11 security packages in Germany seem like 
modest measures in comparison with the British post-September-
11 anti-terrorism law,137 but they set off a storm of protest and 
had to be substantially softened before they could pass through 
the German Parliament.138  Most of the expansion of the 
 
 133. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 11; Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 
supra note 31. 
 134. See Lepsius, supra note 44, at *13-17 (referring to changes in the law that 
allow a person to be the subject of security measures without being concretely 
suspected of any particular offense).  Examples of this include random identity 
checks, general monitoring of international radio telephone traffic, and data-mining 
grid searches based on association with certain social groups or possession of certain 
abstract characteristics, none of which require that the target of the measures be 
specifically suspected of having done anything wrong.  Id. 
 135. Id. at *14. 
 136. See id. at *16-17 (noting that District Courts in Wiesbaden and Berlin as well 
as the Court of Appeal in Dusseldorf have questioned the constitutionality of grid 
searches).   
 137. See infra Part III.B. 
 138. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *22-25 (discussing the adoption of the “second 
SCHEPPELE-12-FI-RSB 6/25/2004  5:29 PM 
116 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 50 
intelligence services’ powers is limited by a sunset provision in 
the second security package that will automatically take effect in 
five years.139  The structural protections against abuse of these 
powers—Parliamentary review, G-10 review and ordinary 
judicial as well as Constitutional Court review—remain in place. 
There are a number of signs that the courts in Germany are 
resisting some of the most worrisome aspects of the new post-
September 11 laws, aggressively affirming that September 11 
cannot cause Germany to lose its human rights bearings.140  Two 
men were charged with participation in the Hamburg cell of al 
Qaeda that planned the September 11 attacks.  They were tried 
in Germany’s ordinary courts.141  The first defendant, Mounir El 
Motassadeq, was convicted of more than 3,000 counts of accessory 
to murder.142  The second defendant, Abdelghani Mzoudi, was 
nearly convicted on similar charges before the case against him 
fell apart when the state could not produce potentially 
exculpatory evidence requested by the judge.143  In both cases, the 
American government refused to provide the German government 
with information acquired as a result of the interrogation of 
Ramzi bin al Shibh, a man who had personally taken credit for 
plotting the September 11 attacks and who was in US custody.144  
Eventually, the conviction of Motassadeq was quashed and the 
case sent back for trial.145  In both cases, German courts refused to 
convict if potentially exculpatory evidence were withheld in 
violation of German law. 
Then, in a case whose facts date from before September 11, 
the Federal Constitutional Court ruled on March 3, 2004 that a 
 
security package” in Parliament). 
 139. Lepsius, supra note 44, at *7. 
 140. See id. at *16-17 (discussing various decisions holding parts of the anti-
terrorism surveillance laws unconstitutional). 
 141. Richard Bernstein, Germans Blame U.S. for Qaeda Acquittal; Americans 
Refused to Supply Evidence, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 7, 2004, at 3. 
 142. Id.; Peter Finn, Moroccan Convicted in Sept. 11 Attacks; German Court 
Delivers Maximum Sentence for Aiding Hamburg Cell, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2003, at 
A1. 
 143. Bernstein, supra note 141, at 3; John Burgess, Verdict Postponed in German 
9/11 Case; Prosecution Claims Eleventh Hour Evidence Against Moroccan Defendant, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2004, at A22. 
 144. John Burgess, German Court Orders New Trial for 9/11 Suspect, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 5, 2004, at A16. 
 145. Luke Harding, First and Only 9/11 Conviction Overturned by German Court, 
GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 5, 2004, at 17. 
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federal law passed pursuant to the 1998 constitutional 
amendment allowing electronic surveillance of the home was 
unconstitutional.146  The majority agreed that the statute had 
intruded too far upon the inviolability of the home by allowing 
surveillance of private conversations among family members and 
between the target of the surveillance and his or her lawyer, 
doctor, or clergyperson.147  Moreover, the statute had not 
sufficiently required there to be “concrete evidence of a crime” 
before the surveillance could be authorized.  The statute had also 
failed to specify that the underlying crime had to be serious 
enough to warrant at least five years in prison before intrusive 
surveillance could be used at all.148  The limitations that the Court 
placed on the government were so severe that it is unlikely 
electronic surveillance of homes can be used at all in the future.  
These two indications—that ordinary courts would not convict 
without all of the evidence and that the Constitutional Court 
would insist on upholding personal privacy against security 
interests—indicate that Germany has not fallen into a state of 
emergency after September 11, even as it has tried to comply 
with the new international law. 
B. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Britain’s constitutional structure could hardly be more 
different from that of Germany’s.  Britain has a constitutional 
government without a written constitution.  In general, Britain’s 
unwritten constitution has been characterized by a high degree of 
continuity, by contrast with the repeated political collapses that 
have led to new constitutions in Germany’s past.  This continuity 
persists to the point where the present British Constitution 
consists of very ancient and very modern rules mixed together.149  
Perhaps the most important principle of the contemporary British 
Constitution is parliamentary supremacy, which tends to work at 
cross-purposes with the claim of an ancient constitution, because 
 
 146. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 1 BvR 2378/98 v. 3.3.2004, available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/cgi-bin/link.pl?aktuell (last visited May 13, 2004); German 
Court Attacks Law on Bugging Criminal, Terror Suspects, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 
March 3, 2004. 
 147. BVerfG, 1 BvR 2378/98 v. 3.3.2004. 
 148. Id. 
 149. As of 1995, “constitutional law” in the volumes labeled as such and published 
by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, contained the text of 138 Acts of Parliament and 
the human rights volumes added another 32 Acts.  But whether all of these laws are 
really constitutional or not is a lively subject of scholarly debate. 
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a single valid vote of that constitutional entity known as the 
Queen-in-Parliament,150 is enough to change even long-standing 
constitutional norms.  Compared with Germany, where legal 
clarity is considered an important constitutional value in and of 
itself, Britain’s constitution is less than clear.  As some 
influential constitutional commentators have remarked, the 
British Constitution is “indeterminate, indistinct, and 
unentrenched.”151 
An intensely debated legal puzzle has been created by the 
European Union.  By entering the European Community in 1973, 
Britain committed itself to the principle that community law is 
supreme over domestic law in those areas where it operates.152  As 
a result, presumably there are some parts of British law, 
including some of its constitutional laws, which now cannot be 
changed with a single vote of the parliament.153  But, this has not 
yet fully been taken on board in British constitutional theory.  
Moreover, Britain is a common law country with a long history of 
valid judge-made law existing beyond the edges of statutory 
enactments.  In Britain, as a result, there is a debate, familiar to 
Americans but quite foreign to Germans, over the extent to which 
any statute has been modified by court interpretation, or indeed 
about the extent to which one court decision has modified, 
supplanted, or nullified another.  This applies to constitutional 
laws, as well as to any other.  In short, the British Constitution is 
a complex, continuing, and amorphous entity but it can be 
changed root and branch overnight.  And, indeed, in recent years 
it has been.154 
 
 150. The Queen-in-Parliament is typically constituted by a majority vote of both 
houses of parliament and nominal assent of the Queen, though under certain 
circumstances, the House of Lords, the upper house of the British parliament, can be 
bypassed in this process.  The monarch last vetoed a law in 1707, which makes the 
non-assent of the Queen a practical impossibility.  As a result, the House of 
Commons, led by the government it elects, has practical control of all constitutional 
matters. 
 151. S.E. FINER ET AL., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS 40 (1995). 
 152. See David Jenkins, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British 
Common-Law Constitution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 863, 953-55 (2003) 
(discussing the supremacy of Community law under the European Communities Act). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Britain has seen a great deal of constitutional change in the last few years: the 
devolution of parliamentary authority to Scotland and Wales, the abolition of 
hereditary peerage in the House of Lords as well as the substantial reduction of the 
number of life peers who can serve as members, the introduction of limited judicial 
review through the Human Rights Act of 1998 that formally incorporated much of 
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Crises like the September 11 terrorist attacks, which were 
sharply felt in Britain, have the potential to create radical 
changes in a short time without many constitutional circuit 
breakers to stop the surge of panic.  Critics claim that this is 
exactly what has happened when the British Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act of 2001155 was passed quickly in the fall of 
2001.156  But before reviewing recent British terrorism laws, it 
should first be established what controls on policing and 
intelligence were in place prior to the new laws because the new 
laws can only be understood against the background of existing 
practices. 
Like the British Constitution itself, the specific mandates 
and separation of functions between the security and police 
agencies of Britain was—from their origins and continuing to the 
present day—indeterminate, indistinct, and unentrenched.157  
Local police departments in Britain, originally too small and with 
too few powers to do much damage, have grown into large 
bureaucracies with ever-increasing powers of surveillance.  The 
police have themselves been policed (or not, as the case may be) 
primarily through various evidentiary exclusionary rules enforced 
by judges when cases come to trial.  These rules include a ban on 
forced confessions, but the same judges that have enforced this 
exclusionary rule traditionally permitted admission of other 
information gathered through police overreaching.158  However, as 
with all common-law-like criminal procedure, a great deal of case-
by-case specificity in these determinations has made it difficult to 
 
the European Convention on Human Rights into British law, but which only came 
into effect in October 2000.  Most recently, the government has floated a proposal to 
abolish the position of Lord Chancellor, a position which united the parliament and 
the executive with the judiciary, and to replace this post with a Secretary for 
Constitutional Affairs, who has the powers of an ordinary minister. 
 155. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 27 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm (last visited June 
19, 2004). 
 156. The only substantial barrier in the way of passing the bill was the opposition 
of the House of Lords, which was overcome within a few days by a government 
reversal on the provision that would have criminalized inciting religious hatred.  See 
Chronology of Home Secretary’s Battle Over Anti-Terrorism Bill, TIMES (London), 
December 15, 2001. 
 157. Peter Gill, Security and Intelligence Services in the United Kingdom, in 
DEMOCRACY, LAW AND SECURITY: INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES IN CONTEMPORARY 
EUROPE, supra note 91, at 267. 
 158. Kuk Cho, Reconstruction of the English Criminal Justice System and its 
Reinvigorated Exclusionary Rules, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 259, 265-67 
(1999). 
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elucidate general policies that police could follow as bright-line 
rules.  They got away with aggressive policing often enough to 
keep it up. 
In general, the surveillance procedures used by both police 
and security services were governed by no discernible legal 
regime at all (unless one counts unpublished guidelines of the 
Home Office as a legal regime) until the passage of the 1985 
Interception of Communications Act.159  This Act permitted both 
police and the security services to engage in telephone tapping, 
mail opening, and electronic communications interception 
through a “warrant” issued by the Secretary of State on any of the 
following grounds: “(a) in the interests of national security; (b) for 
the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime; or (c) for the 
purpose of safeguarding the economic well-being of the United 
Kingdom.”160  The Act has been widely criticized for failing to have 
any separation of powers check in the warrant procedure, since 
only the executive branch authorizes and executes such 
warrants.161  In addition, the Act has been criticized for failing to 
have any criteria capable of clear delineation for issuing these 
warrants.162 
Historically, when there have been domestic disturbances in 
Britain, police departments have created “special branches” 
which could, without much additional guidance, investigate these 
threats both as crimes and for intelligence purposes.  The first 
such special branch was created as part of the Metropolitan 
Police in 1883 during a wave of Irish Nationalist terrorist 
bombings in London.  Other police departments followed suit.163  
These special branches were largely unregulated until 1970, 
when the Home Office issued unpublished guidelines on special 
branch activities, and then revised and published guidelines in 
1984 in response to a parliamentary inquiry into domestic 
 
 159. Interception of Communications Act of 1985, ch. 56 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm47/4778/4778.htm (last 
visited June 19, 2004). 
 160. Id. c. 56, § 1(2)a. 
 161. J.R. Spencer, The Case for a Code of Criminal Procedure, CRIM. L. REV. 2000, 
July, 519, 522-23.  See also Simon A. Price, The Interception of Communications Act 
1985: An Examination of the Government’s Proposals for Reform, COMPUTER & 
TELECOM. L. REV. 1999, 5(6), 163, 163-64 (discussing proposed amendments to the 
law). 
 162. Spencer, supra note 161, at 522-23. 
 163. Gill, supra note 157, at 268. 
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intelligence institutions.164  Only then was it possible for the 
public to see what the special branches were tasked with doing.  
This turned out to be primarily “defending the realm”165 in 
regards to espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion.  This 
broad, lightly defined mission has routinely enabled these police 
units to engage in surveillance of a great deal of legal political 
activity and virtually anything else that in the police’s view might 
constitute a threat.  In 1994, revised guidelines were issued, but 
they did not change this vague and egregious assignment of 
powers.166 
The intelligence agencies were similarly governed quite 
casually.  Both MI5 (the domestic security agency) and MI6 (the 
foreign security agency, more properly called the Secret 
Intelligence Service, or SIS) were established in 1909 when there 
was a German spy scare that panicked government officials.167  
The intelligence agency that collects foreign electronic intercepts, 
or signals intelligence, is the Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), which started for obvious reasons during 
World War I.168  The intelligence unit for the military services, the 
Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS), was started during the 1960s 
when the intelligence services of the various military commands 
were unified in a wave of military reform.169  Foreign-, signals- 
and military-intelligence information are routinely reported to 
the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) which, since its founding 
in 1936, has analyzed this information and reported it to relevant 
government officials for use in policymaking.170  Since 1957, the 
JIC has been part of the Cabinet Office.    
In general, the JIC gives assignments to the foreign-, 
signals- and military-intelligence agencies, instructing them in 
 
 164. Gill, supra note 157, at 269. 
 165. Home Office Guidelines on the Work of a Special Branch, 1984, para. 6, 
available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/mar/special-branch-1984.htm. 
 166. A summary of the main points in the 1994 guidelines can be found at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/mar/special-branch-1995.htm.  As this article 
was going to press, new guidelines were issued by the Home Office in March 2004.  
Guidelines on Special Branch Work in the United Kingdom.  They can be found at 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/special_branch.pdf. 
 167. Gill, supra note 157, at 265, 267; A Brief History of the Security Service, at 
http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page120.html (last visited May 13, 2004). 
 168. Gill, supra note 157, at 267. 
 169. Id. at 267-68. 
 170. Id. at 268. 
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what the policymakers need to know.171  But the control of MI5 is 
less structured.  As a result, MI5 has been largely “self tasking.”172  
MI5 didn’t even have a statutory basis for its existence until 
1989.173 
The first mandate for MI5 was written by the Home Office in 
1945 but never published; another directive from the Home Office 
was issued in 1952, but it too was not published until a judicial 
inquiry released it more than a decade later in its report on a 
security scandal.174  This was the first time that the public could 
see that MI5’s charge was essentially the same “defense of the 
realm” language that had controlled the special branches of the 
police—a mandate highly subject to abuse.  MI5 did not get full 
statutory authorization until the passage of the Security Service 
Act of 1989,175 and then only because Britain rightly feared that 
its minimal human rights guarantees surrounding surveillance 
would be found wanting by the European Court of Human 
Rights.176  The Security Service Act now gives MI5 jurisdiction 
over “national security,” as opposed to “defense of the realm.”  But 
the vague term “national security” covers issues like espionage, 
terrorism, sabotage, and subversion, the very same tasks that 
used to appear under the heading of “defense of the realm.”  The 
 
 171. Gill, supra note 157, at 270. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 270-71. 
 175. Id. at 271.  Security Service Act 1989, c. 5, available at http://www.legislation. 
hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/Ukpga_19890005_en_1.htm. 
 176. Even with the passage of the Security Service Act, the European Court of 
Human Rights continued to find Britain’s surveillance practices to be insufficiently 
regulated.  The major decisions finding that Britain violated Article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights through police violation of individuals’ rights 
of personal privacy are Malone v. UK, [1984] ECHR 8691/79 (Feb. 8, 1984), Halford 
v. UK, (1997) 3 BHRC 31 (June 25, 1997), Khan v. UK, (2000) 8 BHRC 10 (May 12, 
2000), P.G. & J.H. v. UK [2001] ECHR 44787/98 (Sept. 25, 2001), Armstrong v. UK 
[2002] ECHR 48521/99 (July 16, 2002).  Taylor-Sabori v. UK, [2002] ECHR 47114/99 
(Oct. 22, 2002), Allan v. UK [2002] ECHR 48539/99 (Nov. 5, 2002), Chalkley v. UK 
[2003] ECHR 63831/00 (June 12, 2003), Perry v. UK [2003] ECHR 63737/00 (July 17, 
2003); Lewis v. UK [2003] ECHR 1303/02 (Nov. 25, 2003).  Significantly, the number 
of ruling against Britain accelerated after September 11, 2001, though all of these 
rulings to date judge practices under the law before Britain introduced the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) of 2000, ch. 23, available at 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000023.htm or the various anti-terrorism 
laws.  RIPA has been taken note of by the court (in Allan v. United Kingdom [2002]), 
but the court has not yet had an opportunity to rule on facts arising under that law 
nor under the post-September 11 anti-terrorism law that takes many of those 
protections back. 
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statute adds to the old mandate the new task that MI5 can take 
on investigation of threats to the “economic well-being of the 
UK.”177  Rather than constraining MI5’s mandate, the Security 
Service Act seems to have expanded it without making it a great 
deal clearer, or more rights-protective.  And the mandate has 
since been expanded even further.  In 1992, MI5 took 
responsibility for countering the paramilitary groups in Northern 
Ireland, a lead role it took away from the special branch of the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary.178  In 1996, the Security Service Act 
was amended to increase MI5’s role in the “prevention and 
detection of serious crime.”179 
What controls are there over these processes?  Until the 
Human Rights Act of 1998 went into effect in October 2000, 
British judges relied upon their understanding of the common 
law in assessing whether evidence gathered through various 
intrusive methods would be admissible at trial.180  If cases never 
went to trial, there was little practical review available for 
individuals who might claim their rights were violated; even if a 
case did go to trial, it was far from certain that, absent the 
constitutional status of defendants’ rights, judges would accord 
them pride of place.  Still there was a sense that the historic 
rights of Englishmen included some defendants’ rights. Venerable 
though such rights may have seemed, however, they have been 
vanishing through statutory intervention.  For example, the 
British government in 1994 abolished the right to remain silent 
and, more recently, the Blair government pushed through the 
Parliament the abolition of the rule against being tried twice for 
the same offense.181 
 
 177. Gill, supra note 157, at 271. 
 178. Id. at 272, 277. 
 179. Id. at 277. 
 180. For example, the right to remain silent was established as a result of Star 
Chambers abuses in the late seventeenth century when criminal cases were moved to 
common-law courts.  But since in the common law of that time defendants were 
presumed incompetent to testify, the right gradually atrophied because it was never 
invoked.  The right to remain silent was restored formally again only in the late 
nineteenth century, along with the prohibition against adverse inferences from 
silence.  Abusive police practices were not considered until the rise of formal police 
departments in the early twentieth century, but judges were not particularly keen to 
inquire into how the police had treated a suspect in order to obtain his evidence.  
Carol A. Chase, Hearing the “Sounds of Silence” in Criminal Trials: A Look at Recent 
British Law Reforms With an Eye Toward Reforming the American Criminal Justice 
System, 44 KAN. L. REV. 929, 933-38 (1996). 
 181. On the right to remain silent, id. at 937-42.  On the Blair government’s 
SCHEPPELE-12-FI-RSB 6/25/2004  5:29 PM 
124 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 50 
Parliamentary controls over general intelligence policy have 
theoretically ensured that the security services stay within 
bounds.  This review, however, generally has worked only over 
the foreign security services, only recently and only sporadically.  
In 1965, a Security Commission was established to review the 
intelligence agencies, but since it had to be convened by the 
Prime Minister who was typically making use of the intelligence 
products at the time, it rarely met.182  The system was revised in 
the Security Service Act of 1989, through which the security 
services were to be kept in check by a commissioner and a 
tribunal.183  The tribunal consists of three lawyers who are 
empowered to determine whether individual public complaints 
about improper surveillance are warranted.184  The commissioner 
has the power to determine whether the surveillance warrants 
issued by the Secretary of State have complied with procedures 
outlined in the Act.185  In the first decade that the system 
operated, about two hundred complaints were filed but none were 
upheld.186  One might therefore be forgiven for thinking that the 
system did not seem to provide effective oversight.  A later act, 
the Intelligence Services Act of 1994, set MI6 (SIS) and the 
GCHQ on a firm statutory basis (similar to what the 1989 act did 
 
abolition of the double jeopardy rule, see  Robert L. Weinberg,  Try, Try Again: If at 
First They Don’t Succeed, Criminal Prosecutions in England Now Get a Second 
Chance, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 16, 2004, at 52.  The European Convention on Human 
Rights may permit the abolition of double jeopardy in the way the British did it—
which is to permit the reopening of a case only upon the discovery of substantially 
new evidence.  See Protocol No. 7, art. 4: 
Article 4 – Right not to be tried or punished twice 
1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings 
under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already 
been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of that State. 
2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of 
the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, 
if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a 
fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome 
of the case. 
3. No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the 
Convention. 
Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights, November 22, 1984. 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf. 
 182. Gill, supra note 157, at 282-83. 
 183. Id. at 283. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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for MI5).187  This act also created the Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) of the Parliament with the jurisdiction to review 
all of the intelligence agencies.188  Despite some difficulties getting 
access to information, the Intelligence and Security Committee 
has been quite active in reviewing the intelligence services.189  
The increasing boldness of the ISC shows some signs of exercising 
true separation-of-powers control over the intelligence agencies 
for the first time.190 
Of course, Britain’s experience with domestic surveillance 
grows out of its experience in Northern Ireland.  Northern 
Ireland has been dealt with simultaneously as a policing problem 
managed through the special branch of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary, as a domestic security problem managed through 
MI5 and also as a military problem that involved calling in the 
British Army.191  In addition, because of terrorist attacks in 
London and other cities within England, controlling domestic 
terrorism outside of Northern Ireland has been a task shared by 
various special branches of local police forces operating closely 
with MI5.192  Many of the special anti-terrorism laws that 
preceded the general codification in 2000 had applied only in 
Northern Ireland.  But the effects of these special terrorism laws 
spread to criminal law and criminal procedure generally within 
Northern Ireland and the bombings outside of Northern Ireland 
caused separate terrorism laws to be passed that applied to the 
rest of Britain.193  In short, the effects of the “special laws” spread.  
The special regime of legal regulation started with a bifurcation 
between the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 
1973 which made unique rules for Northern Ireland and the more 
general Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 which set forth legal 
procedures for the rest of the UK.194  Various updates and 
 
 187. Gill, supra note 157, at 284. 
 188. Id. at 284. 
 189. Most recently, it played an important role in reviewing the intelligence basis 
on which the British government went to war with Iraq in spring 2003.  See Paul 
Waugh and Kim Sengupta, The ISC Report: Intelligence Worries Vindicated As MPs 
Put Dossier Under the Microscope, INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 12, 2003, at 4. 
 190. See Gill, supra note 157, at 285 (expressing optimism with the future of the 
ISC). 
 191. See id. at 272 (describing the intelligence agency structure in Northern 
Ireland). 
 192. Id. at 272-73. 
 193. Id. at 273. 
 194. The anti-terrorism campaign in Northern Ireland had a dire effect on criminal 
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amendments to these two acts have been in effect ever since.  The 
new fight against terrorism after September 11, with its focus on 
radical Islamist groups operating both domestically and from 
foreign bases, has been fought on terrain largely mapped out for 
another purpose. 
As this brief review indicates, policing functions and 
intelligence functions have been mixed together in the history of 
British security policy and until recently none of them has had 
either an explicit statutory basis or substantial external review.  
There has been no clear division of labor between police and 
intelligence agencies (in fact, MI5 has always worked closely with 
the special branches of the various police forces), and no clear 
division between domestic and foreign responsibilities (police spy 
on foreign groups resident in Britain; the army participated with 
MI5 and the police in Northern Ireland).  As demonstrated below, 
the main impetus to the reform that had been accomplished 
before September 11 has been the persistently negative 
judgments of British practice on the part of the European Court 
of Human Rights. 
The Terrorism Act 2000, initiated when Tony Blair’s Labour 
government came to power in the 1990s, began as a good-
government measure.  At a time when Britain was experiencing 
less domestic terrorism than it had in decades, the Labour 
government (which had also engineered the passage of the 
Human Rights Act) attempted to codify Britain’s myriad of 
crisscrossing and conflicting anti-terrorism statutes into one code 
that would meet human rights standards.195  The “special regime” 
that applied to Northern Ireland through the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provision) Acts was to be softened.  Then, it would be 
 
law and criminal process in Northern Ireland generally outside the field of terrorism.  
Peter G. Eikenberry et al., Northern Ireland: A Report to the Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York From a Mission of the Committee on International Human 
Rights, 54 THE RECORD 426 (1999).  Through most of the time that the Irish 
Republican Army conducted a campaign involving violence in both Northern Ireland 
and in the United Kingdom outside Northern Ireland proper, two different legal 
regimes were introduced for dealing with terrorism offenses.  These two regimes 
magnified differences between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, among other 
things because the UK would banish suspected terrorists back to Northern Ireland 
where they could be dealt with more harshly under a different legal regime.  For a 
history of the two separate systems of terrorism laws in Britain, see  Fionnuala Ni 
Aolain, The Fortification of  an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1353 (1996). 
 195. Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.hmso. 
gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000011.htm (last visited May 13, 2004). 
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combined with relevant bits of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts 
that applied elsewhere in Britain and made into law that applied 
to the whole of the UK, thereby avoiding the need for special 
measures justifiable only in extreme situations.196  In fact, one of 
the stated goals of the codification was enabling Britain to 
withdraw from its derogation under Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) with respect to police 
detention powers governed by Article 5.197  Britain removed its 
derogation when the Terrorism Act 2000 came into force in early 
2001.  But then September 11 occurred.  The 2000 statute was so 
closely followed by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
 
 196. When the European Court of Human Rights considered Britain’s use of 
“special powers” in Northern Ireland, it initially approved them precisely because of 
the dire situation that held sway in the North: 
Unquestionably, the exercise of the special powers was mainly, and before 5 
February 1973 even exclusively, directed against the IRA as an underground 
military force.  The intention was to combat an organisation which had played a 
considerable subversive role throughout the recent history of Ireland and which 
was creating, in August 1971 and thereafter, a particularly far-reaching and 
acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions 
of the six counties and the lives of the province’s inhabitants.  Being confronted 
with a massive wave of violence and intimidation, the Northern Ireland 
Government and then, after the introduction of direct rule (30 March 1972), the 
British Government were reasonably entitled to consider that normal legislation 
offered insufficient resources for the campaign against terrorism and that 
recourse to measures outside the scope of the ordinary law, in the shape of 
extrajudicial deprivation of liberty, was called for. 
Ireland v. United Kingdom, (1980) 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, [1978] ECHR 5310/71, para. 
212. 
Allowing this special legislation by according to Britain a “margin of appreciation” 
within which it could act, the Court’s reasoning also made it clear that only such an 
extreme situation would justify special legislation of this sort. 
 197. WALKER, supra note 42, at xi.  Pursuant to Article 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, states are allowed to derogate from their obligations 
under specific provisions of the Convention by making up-front declarations of both 
their reasons for doing so and the specific articles from which they want to derogate.  
Such derogations are allowed only “in time of war or other public emergency” and 
only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”  Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 46, 50, 53, E.T.S. No. 5, [hereinafter European 
Convention on Human Rights or ECHR], available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm.  The European Court of 
Human Rights reserved the power to review whether the reasons for derogation are 
sufficient and whether the derogations are narrowly crafted to serve legitimate 
purposes.  For  a recent example of the Court’s thinking on these question see Ozkan 
v. Turkey, [2004] ECHR 21689/93 (reiterating from which provisions of the European 
Convention it was not possible to derogate under any circumstances and also judging 
the acceptability of particular practices used in what the respondent country had 
claimed was a state of emergency). 
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2001 (ATCS)198 and its new derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR 
that the new period of non-derogation seemed merely a 
continuation of the previous one. 
The two anti-terrorism laws are enormous (together 
consisting of 250 pages of small type),199 and so it is impossible to 
go into all of their details.  The Terrorism Act 2000 includes a 
new, broad definition of terrorism; substantial sections on 
proscribed organizations and the methods of their proscription; a 
section on terrorist property, including prohibitions on fund 
raising and support for terrorist causes, as well as provisions for 
seizing money used for such purposes; and intricate regulations of 
terrorist investigations and counter-terrorism powers.200  There is 
a still separate section for provisions applying only in Northern 
Ireland even though most of the law now applies everywhere in 
the UK.201  And, there are a number of general and miscellaneous 
provisions that create new crimes (weapons training, incitement 
to terrorism, bombing and terrorism financing) and give guidance 
for when the police may use “reasonable force” in terrorism 
investigations202 as well as indicating when they may stop and 
search both terrorism-related suspects and containers.203 
The 2000 law was praised for deleting a number of notable 
violations against human rights that had existed in previous 
legislation—the power to issue “exclusion orders” (which typically 
removed terrorism suspects from Britain back to Northern 
Ireland), the power to intern suspects indefinitely without trial 
(which was an important cause of the ECHR Article 5 derogation, 
even though the power had not been used since 1975), and the 
criminalization of withholding information from terrorism 
investigations (which had been used to jail those who seemed to 
be collaborating with the Irish Republican Army and other 
terrorist groups by remaining silent about their activities).  Some 
of these much-hated provisions reemerged in the 2001 anti-
terrorism law.  For now, the focus here will be only on those 
provisions that affect investigation and surveillance of suspected 
terrorists. 
 
 198. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 155, at c. 24. 
 199. WALKER, supra note 42, at 291-541. 
 200. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195. 
 201. Id. §§ 65-80. 
 202. Id. § 114. 
 203. Id. § 116. 
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Under the Terrorism Act 2000, no powers that are given to 
the police by common law or by other statutes are diminished; the 
powers given to police under the Act are in addition to those given 
to the police elsewhere.204  The 2000 terrorism law adds that, in 
terrorism investigations, a constable could search homes upon 
getting a warrant from a justice of the peace based on 
demonstration of “reasonable suspicion.”205 This codified the trend 
toward removing warrant power from the Secretary of State and 
internalizing the standard of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which requires individualized and specifiable 
suspicion for searches, surveillance, arrests and detention.  If a 
search involves something other than a private residence—for 
example, in an area cordoned off because it poses an immediate 
danger—the approval of a police superintendent (or someone of 
higher rank) would be enough to authorize the search.206  For 
deliberate seizure and retention of material that might be used as 
evidence, approval of a circuit judge is required, but such 
material can be taken as a byproduct of the search as long as 
acquisition of such materials was not the primary focus going into 
a search.207  In addition, a police officer can compel explanations of 
seized materials from suspects and witnesses, upon getting an 
order from a circuit judge.  If there is an emergency, however, a 
police superintendent can authorize any of the above searches, as 
long as notice is made after the fact to the Secretary of State.208  
Specifically, with regard to Northern Ireland, the Secretary of 
State is authorized to issue all of these warrants and orders in 
lieu of judicial review.209 
In addition to being able to search places and seize things, 
police may be authorized through a disclosure order issued by a 
circuit judge in England and Wales (a sheriff in Scotland or a 
Crown Court judge in Northern Ireland) to acquire information 
from financial institutions pertaining to accounts that may be 
relevant to a terrorism investigation.  A disclosure order allows 
information to be acquired about the identity of account holders, 
as well as specific transactions on the accounts.210  In addition, 
 
 204. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 114. 
 205. Id. § 42. 
 206. Id. §§ 33-35. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. § 87. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, §§ 15-18. 
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public authorities who hold information relevant to a police 
investigation (here, the statute is not limited in its wording to 
terrorism investigations only) may volunteer this information to 
the police (or should turn it over upon being asked), without 
risking sanction under the Data Protection Act 1998.211  Such 
information may include details provided under compulsion to 
state officials, like income disclosures made for tax purposes.  
This provision was first included in the 2000 Act, but the number 
of state agencies that must provide information upon request to 
criminal investigators was increased in the 2001 Act.212 
The provision of the 2000 anti-terrorism law that caused the 
most controversy allows arrest of a terrorism suspect without 
requiring the police to first obtain a warrant.  Section 41(1) of the 
2000 law is quite blunt: “A constable may arrest without warrant 
a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist.”213  There 
is no requirement, as there would be for an ordinary arrest, that 
there be suspicion of a specific offense that the suspect has 
committed or is about to commit.  Mere suspicion of being a 
terrorist is enough.  This is where the particularly broad 
definition of terrorism outlined in the 2000 Act becomes 
important—terrorism-related offenses not only include having 
committed or having actively planned to carry out a terrorist 
attack, but also include various forms of membership, support 
and other relatively passive forms of being on the fringes of 
terrorist groups.214 
Moreover, when suspects are apprehended under Section 41, 
they do not have to be informed of the reasons for detention, as 
would be required in a normal arrest.  Under Section 41, 
detention can last up to forty-eight hours without bringing the 
suspect before a judge, but this period is extendable up to five 
days depending on a complicated formula for review that depends 
upon the circumstances and place of the arrest (different rules 
apply in Northern Ireland).215  A request for an extension of 
detention without charges can be made to a judge (different types 
of judges are specified for the different parts of the UK) by 
someone at the rank of police superintendent or higher.  Upon 
 
 211. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, §§ 20-21. 
 212. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 155. 
 213. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 41(1). 
 214. Id. § 1. 
 215. For more analysis of Section 41, see WALKER, supra note 42, at 119-23. 
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such a request, a judge may extend the period of detention for up 
to an additional five days.216  Combining the original forty-eight 
hours with the additional five-day extension means that suspects 
can be held for an entire week without being charged, or in fact, 
without the police ever having to show that there was reasonable 
suspicion that the suspect committed or was about to commit any 
criminal offense.217 
Another feature of Article 41 that provoked criticism 
involved the right to counsel.  While detained persons in Britain 
generally have the right to counsel from the start of their 
detention, such rights may be suspended for terrorism suspects 
for up to forty-eight hours under Article 41 upon showing that 
providing access to such counsel may interfere with the police’s 
ability to gather information about the commission, preparation 
or instigation of acts of terrorism or if consultation with counsel 
would tip off someone and make it more difficult to prevent an act 
of terrorism or apprehend other suspects.218  For similar reasons, 
access to the telephone to notify family members or counsel may 
also be denied for up to forty-eight hours.  And, when access to 
counsel is finally granted, a detainee may be allowed to consult 
counsel only within the sight and hearing of an inspector, which 
means that the meeting cannot be private. 
Criticism of the right-to-counsel provisions centered on the 
worry that intrusive and pressured interrogation would occur in 
the period before the detainees were allowed to see a lawyer.  
Even when a lawyer was allowed to be present, frank 
consultation might reveal to the police further evidence to use 
against the detainee.  The provisions for arrest without warrant 
together with the ability of the police to detain suspects and deny 
them counsel for forty-eight hours, all before bringing them 
 
 216. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 41. 
 217. It was this change in the structure of the detention period that allowed Britain 
to withdraw its derogation from Article 5 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.  The European Court of Human Rights had held, most saliently in Britain’s 
case in Brogan v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 117 (1988), that the 
shortest of the detention periods at issue in that case—four days and six hours—
was too long to comply with Article 5(3), which provides that “Everyone arrested or 
detained . . . shall be brought promptly before a judge . . . .”  Id.  Critics of the 2000 
law thought that a week of detention without proof of reasonable suspicion that the 
detainee had committed or was about to commit an offense would still run afoul of 
European Court of Human Rights’ mandates, regardless of whether or not some of 
the detention had been approved by a judge.  See WALKER, supra note 42, at 123-24. 
 218. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 41. 
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before a judge, present a most unattractive package in human 
rights terms.  And that was the pre-September-11 law.   
The 2001 Act adds provisions that allow the police to take 
extraordinary means to identify suspects, including those 
arrested without warrant.  These extraordinary means, including 
fingerprinting and intimate searches to discover birthmarks and 
other distinctive bodily markings, can occur without the consent 
of the person searched.219  In addition, police are permitted to take 
photographs of both the detainee and their distinctive bodily 
markings.220  To aid in identification, police may remove 
“disguises” that block a clear view of the suspect’s body, 
particularly the face.221  The reference here could be to Islamic 
scarves, the hijab, or other forms of dress that devout Muslim 
women wear and that would cause enormous embarrassment and 
a sense of being disrespected if removed.  Given its potential to be 
used for harassment of particular segments of the population, 
this provision has come under criticism. 
In Section 44 of the 2000 terrorism law, any constable in 
uniform is authorized to stop and search both vehicles and 
pedestrians, including anything carried by either.  A constable 
can do this without concrete suspicion of the specific persons or 
cars stopped, as long as the place where the stop occurs is 
specified in an authorization received beforehand.222  This section 
of the law was designed to handle threats of vehicle bombs in 
particular.  The authorization to search cars, passengers, and 
pedestrians may be given by a police officer who is at the rank of 
assistant chief constable or higher.223  The Secretary of State must 
be informed of such authorizations, and may cancel any 
 
 219. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 155, §§ 89-91. 
 220. Id. §§ 92-93. 
 221. Id. §§ 94-95. 
 222. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 44.  This provision has been used in 
dramatic ways.  For example, the Metropolitan Police Department covering the 
London metropolitan area declared its entire jurisdiction a stop-and-search zone for 
an entire month in August and September 2003.  Michael Paterson, Terror Laws 
Used on Arms Protesters, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 11, 2003, at 6.  This was 
challenged in court both by a journalist, who was trying to cover a demonstration 
against an arms-sale fair being held in London, and by one of the demonstrators.  
Both had been stopped and searched without any individuated suspicion that they 
were involved in criminal activity.  The court upheld these searches.  R (on the 
application of Gillan and another) v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [2003] 
EWHC 2545 (Admin), [2003] All ER (D) 526 (Oct), (Approved judgment). 
 223. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 44. 
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authorization if he sees fit.224  While this review is better than 
nothing, it does not have the independence guaranteed by judicial 
review.  Beyond these powers, the 2001 Act allows the British 
Transport Police or the Ministry of Defense to specify places 
where vehicles and pedestrians can be stopped for up to twenty-
eight days at a time.225  Under both the 2000 and 2001 laws, these 
authorizations can result in “blanket searches”—that is, searches 
carried out without the police having to show reasonable 
suspicion that the specific cars or persons searched have any 
connection to either terrorism or crime. 
The immigration-related sections of the 2001 law have 
received the most condemnation and have required that Britain 
once again derogate from Article 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  Under the post-September 11 law, the Secretary 
of State may certify a person as a suspected international 
terrorist.  The Secretary may do so if he “a) believes that the 
person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national 
security and b) suspects that the person is a terrorist.”226  The 
evidentiary basis for such a judgment is not specified in the law.  
The effect of such certification is to allow indefinite detention, 
without trial, of those suspects who are not British subjects.227  
There is an appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC), which can quash any individual certification 
that it believes not to be sustainable.228  However, since the 
statute expressly permits indefinite detention of aliens pending 
removal, there is little else the Commission can do once it finds 
that the Secretary of State meets the low standards.229  Under 
 
 224. Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 195, § 46. 
 225. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 155, § 98. 
 226. Id. § 21(1).  Since the operative terms here are “believes” and “suspects,” it 
puts the legal onus on the proof of the Secretary of State’s mental state rather than 
on what the detainee has done. 
 227. Id. § 23. 
 228. Id. § 25. 
 229. Nonetheless, in a decision of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
(SIAC) of July 30, 2002, the Commission found Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act of 2001 to be in breach of the Human Rights Act 1998, particularly 
those provisions that brought into British law Article 5 and Article 14 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.  SIAC reasoned: 
We have decided that the Government was entitled to form the view that there 
was and still is a public emergency threatening the life of the nation and that 
the detention of those reasonably suspected to be international terrorists 
involved with or with organisations linked to Al Qa’ida is strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation. However, there has been no derogation from Article 
14 which prohibits discrimination in the application of the ECHR. The Act 
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SIAC procedures, there is a limited ability for a detainee to 
challenge the evidence that is presented against him, and because 
of the sensitive nature of the information that may be presented, 
the detainee may not necessarily be represented throughout the 
process by counsel of his choosing, but must instead be 
represented by someone appointed by SIAC with the relevant 
security clearance.  Both the detainee and his chosen counsel may 
be excluded from all or part of any hearing on the detainee’s 
case.230 
The issue that gave rise to this framework for indefinite 
detention arose from facts that became clear in the case of 
Chahal v. United Kingdom231 before the European Court of 
Human Rights.  In Chahal, Britain had determined that Chahal 
was a suspected terrorist and should be deported back to his 
home country of India.232  However, Chahal, being a Sikh activist, 
had already been beaten at the hands of Indian police, and he 
faced the very real possibility of such treatment again.233  As a 
result, the European Court of Human Rights indicated Britain 
would violate Article 3 of the Convention (on the prohibition of 
torture as well as degrading and inhuman treatment) if it 
 
permits the detention of non-British citizens alone and it is quite clear from the 
evidence before us that there are British citizens who are likely to be as 
dangerous as non-British citizens and who have been involved with Al Qa’ida or 
organisations linked to it. It is not only discriminatory and so unlawful under 
Article 14 to target non-British citizens but also it is disproportionate in that 
there is no reasonable relationship between the means employed and the aims 
sought to be pursued. On that ground, we have decided that the 2001 Act, which 
is the measure derogating from the obligations under the Convention, to the 
extent that it permits only the detention of foreign suspected international 
terrorists is not compatible with the Convention. 
Summary of SIAC judgment, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/ 
2002/jul/SIAC.pdf. 
This case was appealed by the government to the court of appeal which, in A and 
others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWCA Civ 1502, [2003] 
1 All ER 816, 13 BHRC 394, determined that the government had good reason to 
believe that emergency conditions prevailed, and therefore the UK’s derogation from 
Article 5 was valid.  The court of appeal further determined that distinctions 
between citizens and aliens did not run afoul of the ECHR Article 14 prohibition on 
discrimination.  Id.  So, while the British courts ultimately rejected SIAC’s challenge 
to the law, it was astonishing that the court charged with review of the immigration 
cases found parts of the 2001 law to be in violation of human rights standards. 
 230. See Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A 
Proportionate Response to 11 September, 65 MOD. L. REV. 724, 740-41 (2002) 
(providing details of the procedures under SIAC). 
 231. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997). 
 232. Id. at 423. 
 233. Id. at 424. 
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deported Chahal to India.234  Britain, having determined that 
Chahal was dangerous, did not want to release him either.235  The 
British government decided to keep him in indefinite detention 
even though Chahal had not been found guilty of violating any 
law in Britain.  One obvious solution, that Chahal be put on trial 
in Britain, was rejected by the government, which cited both the 
sensitivity of the evidence that would have to be presented and 
the high standard of proof that would have to be met.236  The 
solution to this conundrum—where the British government was 
unwilling to put a suspect on trial and unable to deport him to his 
home country—was indefinite detention without trial.237 
Since the 2001 anti-terrorism law was passed, at least 
fourteen people have been indefinitely detained under these 
provisions.238  Most have been held for more than two years 
already in harsh conditions, confined to their cells for at least 
twenty-two hours a day.239  According to press reports, one has 
had polio since childhood and is steadily getting worse, another 
entered detention having already lost two limbs and a third has 
attempted suicide.  Several of the detainees were held because 
they had been involved in fundraising to help the Chechen side of 
the war in Chechnya; others are suspected of being members of 
the GIA, an Algerian group linked to terrorist incidents in 
France, Canada and the United States.240  But their identities, 
and the allegations against them, have never been made public in 
any official way. 
Another change in the 2001 anti-terrorism law that has 
caused concern is Section 117.  While the 2000 law was lauded for 
dropping the obligation of bystanders to assist the police in their 
inquiries, at the expense of being forced under penalty of law to 
inform on friends and relatives, the 2001 anti-terrorism law 
brought this measure back again.241  Now those who merely keep 
silent instead of volunteering active assistance to the police 
 
 234. Chahal, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 436. 
 235. Id. at 425. 
 236. Fenwick, supra note 230, at 731. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Martin Bright, Revealed: Shocking Truth of Britain’s ‘Camp Delta,’ OBSERVER 
(London), Dec. 14, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/humanrights/ 
story/0,7369,1106666,00.html (last visited May 13, 2004). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, supra note 155, § 117. 
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subject themselves to criminal liability if they are in possession of 
any facts material to a terrorism inquiry. 
With the start of 2004, the Blair government was floating a 
series of proposals that would result in far more draconian 
exercises of state power as part of its war against terrorism.  The 
government proposed to overhaul the Civil Contingencies Law, 
which outlined the legal conditions for declaring and maintaining 
a state of emergency in Britain.242  In this law, an emergency was 
defined rather loosely as an “event or situation which threatens 
serious damage to human welfare . . . the environment . . . or the 
security of . . . a place in Britain.”243  However, if an emergency 
were to be declared, authorized measures would include 
instituting public curfews, banning public meetings, and seizing 
private property without compensation.244  The government could 
take control of major financial institutions, declare a bank 
holiday, and allow ministers to amend any act of parliament in 
order to deal with an emergency.245  The bill stirred up substantial 
public concern and the government seemed inclined to back off 
some of its more astonishing claims of power, agreeing, for 
example, to say that any temporary legislation adopted without 
parliamentary approval (another power authorized in the draft 
bill) would have to be retrospectively approved by the parliament 
within thirty days or it would sunset.246  But the government has 
not withdrawn the bill.247 
More recently, Home Secretary David Blunkett has made a 
series of proposals that would affect the protections given 
criminal defendants, particularly terrorism suspects.  In addition 
to proposing that the standard of proof be lowered in criminal 
cases involving terrorism charges and that the government be 
allowed to act “preemptively” against terrorism suspects, 
Blunkett also suggested that courts accept evidence from 
 
 242. United Kingdom, A Draft of the Civil Contingencies Law, at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmbills/014/2004014.htm (last 
visited May 13, 2004). 
 243. Id. § 1(1). 
 244. Id. § 21. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Matthew Tempest, Government Backs Down on Terror Bill, GUARDIAN 
(London), Jan. 7, 2004, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/attacks/ 
story/0,1320,1117712,00.html. 
 247. Mike Merritt, Isles Could be Terror Attack Refugee Camps, MAIL ON SUNDAY 
(London), June 6, 2004, at 25. 
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electronic surveillance, something courts in Britain presently do 
not do.248  These proposals also prompted an outcry, but the 
proposals are still under review. 
As can be seen from this quick review of Britain’s recent 
anti-terrorism laws, separate legal regimes of surveillance, 
arrest, and detention have been instituted for those suspected of 
terrorism offenses.  While the laws speak of giving these new 
powers to the police, it is clear from the history of British counter-
terrorism policy that the police have, in general, worked hand in 
hand with MI5, exchanging information, personnel and 
investigatory strategy.  Given the relative powerlessness of 
British courts to challenge statutes, it appears that the only 
substantial check on these procedures will come from the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
IV.  THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE INSTITUTIONS 
Within the Council of Europe, a political community 
comprising forty-five countries, efforts to fight terrorism go back 
several decades with the centerpiece being the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism of 1977.249  After 
September 11, a new Protocol amending this treaty was opened 
for signature, in order to “strengthen the fight against terrorism, 
while respecting human rights.”250  This Protocol updated the list 
of terrorism offenses to include those incorporated since the time 
of the original agreement in various conventions of the United 
Nations and made the further amendment of this Convention 
easier in order to take new developments into account.251 
Perhaps more importantly, given the Council of Europe’s 
primary mandate to ensure human rights protection, the 
Committee of Ministers adopted Guidelines on Human Rights 
and the Fight against Terrorism.252  While recognizing that 
 
 248. Alan Travis & Richard Norton-Taylor, Blunkett Wants Big Expansion of MI5 
and New Security Laws to Counter Terror Threat, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 23, 2004, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/ 0,12780,1153808,00.html. 
 249. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, T.S. No. 
90, 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ 
EN/Treaties/Html/090.htm. 
 250. Protocol Amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 
Treaty Open for Signature by Member States Signatories to Treaty ETS 90 on  May 
15, 2003, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/190.htm. 
 251. Id. art. 1-2. 
 252. Council of Europe, Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against 
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terrorist attacks are themselves violations of the human rights of 
affected populations and that states not only have the right, but 
also the obligation, to protect their populations against these 
attacks, the guidelines set out ground rules that states must 
follow in fighting terrorism.  It is these ground rules that ensure 
respect for human rights in the fight itself.  In particular, the 
guidelines require that all states’ measures to fight terrorism be 
free of arbitrariness and discrimination, and that the measures 
be “subject to appropriate supervision.”253  In addition, all 
measures that the states take to combat terrorism must 
themselves be lawful, and when any measure restricts human 
rights, those restrictions must “be defined as precisely as possible 
and be necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued.”254  The 
guidelines also establish an absolute prohibition on torture, from 
which derogation is not possible, as well as clear rules about the 
collection of personal data.255  There are minimum standards for 
arrests, requiring “reasonable suspicion.”256 The guidelines 
require judicial supervision of the processes of arrest and 
detention  and permit no detentions without judicial review.257  
They set fixed limits for police custody and require guarantees of 
independence and impartiality of the judges in any legal 
proceeding.258  The guidelines maintain that there should be right 
to counsel (with some restrictions on free communication with 
counsel in the interests of security).259  They also urge cooperation 
of countries in extradition proceedings (except where the suspect 
may face the death penalty, torture or persecution for 
discriminatory reasons in the receiving country).260  And they 
recommend compensation for victims of terrorism.261  Broadly 
speaking, the guidelines follow the same general principles 
enunciated by the European Court of Human Rights in their long 
line of terrorism cases. 
 
Terrorism, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on July 
11, 2002, available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/h-inf(2002)8eng.pdf. 
 253. Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, supra note 
252, art. II. 
 254. Id. art. III. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. art. VII. 
 257. Id. arts. VII, VIII.    
 258. Id. art. IX.   
 259. Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, supra note 
252, art. IX.  
 260. Id. art. XIII.   
 261. Id. art. XVII.   
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Neither Germany nor Britain’s anti-terrorism responses can 
be understood in full without reference to the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that binds both 
countries in a common commitment to protect human rights.262  
When domestic mechanisms fail to keep a country’s practices in 
accord with the ECHR, individuals whose rights have been 
violated may appeal against the state to the ECtHR in 
Strasbourg. Given our brief surveys of the anti-terrorism policies 
of Germany and the UK, it will not be surprising to discover that 
the ECtHR has had a far greater direct impact on the UK than on 
Germany, if only for the simple reason that the UK’s domestic 
institutions, including the courts, do not yet reliably produce 
results in compliance with the court’s view of the ECHR.  
Germany, on the other hand, is rarely reprimanded with a 
negative judgment in this area. 
Cases take a long time to reach final decision at the 
ECtHR,263 so there are no cases arising on post-September-11 
 
 262. The European Court of Human Rights is a creature of the Council of Europe, 
not the European Union.  Council of Europe, The European Court of Human Rights: 
Historical Background, Organisation and Procedure, at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm (last visited May 14, 
2004).  In practice, however, all of the member states (and all of the accession states) 
of the European Union are also member states in the Council of Europe.  The Council 
of Europe, however, encompasses not only the twenty-five member states of the 
European Union, but also includes twenty additional states, most in Eastern Europe.  
Council of Europe, About the Council of Europe, at 
http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe (last visited May 14, 2004).  In addition to the 
forty-five member states, there are also five states or entities with observer status: 
the United States, Canada, Japan, Mexico and the Holy See.  Id.  Membership in the 
Council of Europe requires a country to enter the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  Id.  European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197.  The 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is technically binding only on 
the parties to the specific cases, but it is advisable for other countries whose practices 
may raise similar issues to adjust their laws and practices to comply with the norms 
that may one day be applied in a concrete case to them. 
 263. In most countries, petitioners have to have exhausted all domestic remedies 
before lodging a valid appeal at the ECHR.  The court then issues an admissibility 
decision, which is akin to a certiorari decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, except that 
such admissibility decisions generally come with opinions of their own.  The case, if 
admitted, will then be slated for a hearing, which can take time because of the court’s 
heavy workload.  As a result, the process typically takes from five to seven years 
from the time a case is filed to the time it reaches final disposition.  Cases now being 
decided by the court typically refer to facts that arose nearly a decade ago.  See 
generally Paul Mahoney, New Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights 
Resulting from the Expanding Case Load and Membership, 21 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 
101 (2002) (discussing the burden the expanding caseload places on the fulfillment of 
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facts that have generated judgments yet.  Nonetheless, terrorism 
and its attempted control are nothing new in the states under the 
jurisdiction of the court, so there have been a number of 
terrorism-related issues that have been decided since September 
11 on facts that arose years ago.  None show a major change in 
the court’s firm commitment to the preservation of human rights 
of potential suspects, even after that watershed date. 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence on terrorism, outlining the 
legitimate methods for fighting terrorist threats, covers a wide 
variety of areas.  Through a series of cases arising out of the 
Turkish Security Courts, where terrorism-related trials are 
conducted, the court has held that special tribunals on which 
military judges may sit are inappropriate for trying civilian 
defendants because military judges are not impartial as between 
an individual and the state.264  The European Convention in 
Article 6(1) requires that hearings be conducted by an 
“independent and impartial tribunal established by law,”265 and in 
the view of the court, military tribunals or civilian tribunals with 
military judges, violate the requirement of impartiality.266  The 
court has retained this view, even after September 11.  In a high-
profile case involving Turkey’s most well-known terrorist, 
Abdullah Ocalan, the court still insisted that Turkey’s system of 
military tribunals did not provide adequate guarantees of judicial 
independence.267 
The court has developed a substantial jurisprudence on the 
acceptable length of detention, interpreting the provision of 
European Convention Article 5(3)  that everyone arrested or 
detained “shall be brought promptly before a judge.”268  Britain’s 
regime of extended detention in terrorism cases in Northern 
 
the court’s mission). 
 264. See, e.g., Sener v. Turkey, App. No. 26680/95, [2000] ECHR 26680/95, July 18, 
2000. 
 265. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 6(1). 
 266. The court concluded:  
certain aspects of these judges’ status made their independence and impartiality 
questionable . . . for example, the fact that they are servicemen who still belong 
to the army, which in turn takes its orders from the Executive; the fact that they 
remain subject to military discipline; and the fact that decisions pertaining to 
their appointment are to a great extent taken by the administrative authorities 
and the army . . . . 
Sener, [2000] ECHR 26680/95. 
 267. Ocalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, [2003] ECHR 46221/99, Mar. 12, 2003. 
 268. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 5(3). 
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Ireland was found to be inconsistent with the Article 5(3) in 
Brogan v. United Kingdom.269  In that case, various detainees 
were held under anti-terrorism laws for periods ranging from four 
to six days and were released without ever having been charged 
or brought before a judge to have their detentions reviewed.270  
Without defining a bright-line number of hours or days, the court 
held that detention periods of this length without judicial review 
were too long.271  There is, however, a bright line with respect to 
unacknowledged detention, which is, in the view of the court, a 
“grave violation” of Article 5.272  In Orhan v. Turkey, relatives of 
the petitioner had been taken away by the security forces in 
Turkey, never to be seen again.  One of the many violations the 
court found on these facts was the lack of acknowledgement that 
those taken were in detention at all.273 
The ECtHR also has weighed in on the acceptability of 
pretrial detention in a case from France, in which the petitioner 
had been held for trial for five years and seven months before 
finally being acquitted.274  According to the court, this delay was a 
breach of both Article 5(3) under which a defendant is “entitled to 
trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”275 and 
Article 6(1) under which a defendant is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing “within a reasonable time.”276 
The specific treatment of those in state detention has also 
been the subject of a number of ECtHR rulings.  In a case 
growing out of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland, the court found 
that Britain’s treatment of detainees, who had been held under 
the early terrorism laws, violated Article 3 of the Convention 
because the detainees had been subjected to inhuman and 
degrading treatment.277  The detainees were subjected to hooding, 
sleep deprivation, food deprivation, “wall standing” (being made 
 
 269. Brogan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 11209/84, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 (1988). 
 270. Id. at 120-22. 
 271. Id. at 135-36. 
 272. Orhan v. Turkey, App. No. 25656/94 [2002] ECHR 25656/94, June 18, 2002. It 
might also be noted that this was a case decided after September 11 and after 
widespread publicity surrounding the American detention of “enemy combatants” at 
Guantánamo. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Tomasi v. France, App. No. 12850/87, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1993). 
 275. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 5(3). 
 276. Id. art. 6(1); Tomasi, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 36, 39. 
 277. Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25 (1980). 
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to stand in a position that induced pain when held over a long 
period of time) and sustained exposure to stressful noises before 
and during their interrogations.278  This treatment was held to fall 
short of torture,279 but was aimed at causing disorientation and 
sensory deprivation to weaken the resolve of the detainees during 
interrogation.  As a result, the use of these techniques violated 
Article 3 because they constituted degrading and inhuman 
treatment. 
Techniques causing sustained pain can give rise to a finding 
that a state has engaged in torture under Article 3.280  Turkey has 
been found in violation of Article 3 in a case involving a man 
suspected of being a member of the PKK, the Kurdish separatist 
group that had committed a number of terrorist acts in Turkey.281  
The court found that the man had suffered loss of the use of his 
hands and nerve damage in both arms as a result of being hung 
for extended periods of time and exposed to electric shocks, 
treatment which amounted to torture.282  No criminal case was 
ever brought against him, nor were investigations conducted into 
his allegations of torture at the hands of the state.  The court held 
that “the treatment was of such a serious and cruel nature that it 
could only be described as torture” and a breach of Article 3.283  
Because the petitioner had been held for fourteen days without 
being brought before a judge, Turkey was also found in breach of 
Article 5(3), though it had explicitly derogated from this article.284  
Another Turkish case involved a human rights worker who had 
been suspected of involvement with the PKK.285  The petitioner 
claimed that while she had been detained by the police, she had 
been tortured by being hung naked and subjected to electric 
shocks, threatened with rape and even death.286  Although the 
court in this case could not resolve the factual issue concerning 
 
 278. Ireland, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 81-85. 
 279. Id. at 80. 
 280. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 3. 
 281. Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1997). 
 282. Id. at 560-61. 
 283. Id. at 585. 
 284. Id. at 590.  Turkey derogated under Article 15 of the Convention, which allows 
a country in time of war to take measures contrary to the Convention to the “extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation . . . .”  Id. at 586 (quoting European 
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 15).  But the Convention does not 
permit derogation from Article 3.  Id. at Art. 15(2). 
 285. Veznedaroglu v. Turkey, App. No. 32357/96, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 59 (2001). 
 286. Id. at 63. 
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whether or not the treatment she had alleged had occurred, the 
court found that the state nonetheless had obligations under 
Article 3 to investigate the allegations, which the state had not 
done.287  Consequently, Turkey was found to be in breach of the 
Convention.288 
According to the ECtHR jurisprudence, the right to counsel 
applies even in terrorism cases.  In two British cases, Averill v. 
United Kingdom289 and Murray v. United Kingdom,290 it was 
determined that Britain was in violation of Article 6, which 
guarantees the right to defend oneself through legal assistance.  
The facts of the cases arose out of the same basic circumstances 
under similar legal regimes.  Petitioners were detained under the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 for 
crimes committed growing out of the situation in Northern 
Ireland, and in both cases, they were told that adverse inferences 
could be drawn if they remained silent.291  Both petitioners asked 
for legal counsel, which was refused in both cases under 
provisions of the terrorism laws.292  Murray was interrogated for 
twenty-one hours without counsel and refused to answer 
questions.293  He was denied access to a lawyer for forty-eight 
hours.  His refusal to answer questions was then introduced as 
evidence against him at trial and the judge was permitted to 
draw an adverse inference from his silence.294  Averill was sent for 
forensic examination during which hairs were taken from his 
head and fibers were recovered from his clothes.295  He refused to 
answer questions either about the actions for which he was 
arrested or about the hairs and fibers that were later used as 
evidence.296  His request for a lawyer went unfulfilled for more 
than twenty-four hours.297  Later, his silence was presented 
against him at trial and an adverse inference requested.298  He 
 
 287. Veznedaroglu, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 67. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Averill v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36408/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (2000).  
 290. Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18731/91, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29 (1996).  
 291. Id. at 46; Averill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40. 
 292. Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 32; Averill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 41. 
 293. Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 32. 
 294. Id. at 33. 
 295. Averill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 43. 
 298. Id. at 44. 
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was convicted.299  In both cases before the ECtHR, the court found 
a violation of Article 6.300  Precisely because the terrorism law 
allowed adverse inferences from silence, the court explained that 
petitioner had an especially urgent right to have access to counsel 
from the beginning of an interrogation. 
Perhaps the densest jurisprudence in the area of criminal 
procedure relates to the permissible conditions for electronic 
surveillance under Article 8 of the Convention, which provides a 
right to respect for private and family life, home, and 
correspondence.301  This article includes a second section that 
allows interference with the right “in accordance with the law” 
but only where “necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of a 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom 
of others.”302  Nonetheless, something still remains of the privacy 
protections identified in the first section of Article 8. 
The Klass303 case, arising out of the German law on electronic 
surveillance, was heard by the Federal Constitutional Court in 
Germany.  The case involved a challenge to the law passed 
subsequent to the constitutional amendment of Article 10, which 
concerned privacy of communications and allowed electronic 
surveillance in the absence of judicial review as long as some sort 
of parliamentary review was available.304  Despite vigorous 
dissents, the Federal Constitutional Court upheld most of the 
law, ruling that the G-10 committees described above were 
sufficient guarantors of legality in the administration of the 
surveillance procedures.305  Finding the part of the statute that 
barred notification to be unconstitutional, the Federal 
Constitutional Court held that the target of the surveillance had 
to be notified once the surveillance was over.306  The petitioners 
 
 299. Averill, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40. 
 300. Id. at 54; Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40-41. 
 301. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 197, art. 8. 
 302. Id. 
 303. The Klass Case, Judgment of 15 December 1970, BVerfGE 30, 1.  See also 
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went to the European Court of Human Rights, which agreed with 
the Federal Constitutional Court.307  The ECtHR found that some 
surveillance was indeed necessary to preserve national security 
and to protect against crime, but 
The Court, being aware of the danger such a law poses of 
undermining and even destroying democracy on the ground 
of defending it, affirms that Contracting States may not, in 
the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, 
adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.  The Court 
must be satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is 




While the ECtHR noted that judicial review is usually preferred, 
it found that the German alternative had sufficient protections, 
including individualized review, that enabled it to pass muster 
under the European Convention. 
The ECtHR elaborated its views about the legality of 
surveillance under the European Convention in a series of later 
cases, of which Huvig v. France309 presents the best overview of 
the court’s requirements.  The court found that telephone tapping 
was a violation of Article 8, which might nonetheless be justified 
if it were “necessary in a democratic society” and “in accordance 
with law.”310  Even though France had no statutory basis for 
telephone tapping, it had case law that could amount to a legal 
basis for such practices.311  Nonetheless, the application of the law 
would not be foreseeable since actual wiretaps were done in 
secret and no one could know whether their actions put them at 
risk of being tapped.312  According to the court, the case law was 
uncertain and allowed too much discretion to each judge who was 
permitted to issue wiretap warrants, and citizens had to have an 
adequate indication of the circumstances in which such practices 
could be permitted.313  In particular, the law had to specify the 
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offenses for which warrants could be issued, the permissible 
duration of the surveillance and the limits on what could be done 
with the results of such wiretaps.314  Having a particularly precise 
law that contained safeguards for the personal privacy of citizens 
was a necessity under the European Convention. 
Since September 11, the European Court of Human Rights 
has issued a number of decisions that provide reason to believe 
that the court will not allow its jurisprudence to bend in the face 
of the terrorist attacks.  In fact, in a case issued just two weeks 
after September 11, the court found that a listening device 
installed in a prison cell violated Article 8 of the Convention, and 
the court repeated its criteria for legitimate electronic 
surveillance without flinching in light of recent events.315 
September 11 seems to have had no discernible impact on 
the jurisprudence of the court, which has insisted in previous 
terrorism cases that terrorism offenses provided no special 
grounds for deviation from the Convention’s requirements.  
Despite the large number of legal changes that are taking place 
in response to September 11, it is clear that the European Court 
of Human Rights believes fighting terrorism need not be done by 
changing the standards of protection for human rights. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 After September 11, international pressures emanating from 
the UN Security Council have required all states to take steps to 
fight terrorism.  Within the European Union, actions of various 
EU bodies have also encouraged member states to modify their 
domestic laws in response to September 11.  But the examination 
of what Britain and Germany have done in the wake of 
September 11 reveal that transnational pressures explain very 
little of the specific responses of these two states.  While both 
Britain and Germany enacted major anti-terrorism laws after 
September 11, the specifics of those laws were very different, 
even as both faced identical international mandates.  In 
particular, Britain continued its own past practices of treating 
terrorism offenses in an exceptional manner with methods that 
have in the past been held to violate the standards of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and will probably be held 
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in the future to do so as well.  Germany, by contrast, maintained 
careful constitutional protections even while responding to the 
demands of transnational institutions to revise its laws.  
Germany, too, continued along the lines it had previously 
followed in its own constitutional development, being particularly 
cautious in the context of its post-war constitution to maintain 
clear checks on potentially abusive powers.    
 The reactions of transnational institutions to September 11 
varied as well.  While the Security Council and the EU took steps 
to toughen anti-terrorism efforts, the Council of Europe 
institutions in general, and the European Court of Human Rights 
in particular, reinforced their commitment to upholding high 
human rights standards.  Understanding the difference in the 
responses of international institutions also requires that we 
examine what each of these institutions was doing before 
September 11.  The Security Council’s mandate involved dealing 
with threats to international peace and security, so terrorism 
appeared first and foremost as a threat of the sort that results-
driven hard-edged measures could be used to address.  The 
Security Council had little experience in considering human 
rights, and September 11 did not make the Security Council move 
into a direction that it had previously never gone.  Similarly with 
the European Union.  EU institutions had been presiding over 
ever-increasing cooperation among European member states 
without having their own rights charter or specialist bodies 
charged with defending rights as their primary task.  Not 
surprisingly, the EU responded by doing more of what it had done 
before–creating  more common institutions and procedures, 
increasing cooperation across a wider range of topics, and trying 
to define more of their joint legal space as common legal space.  
Finally, the European Court of Human Rights, with the primary 
responsibility for upholding human rights norms given in the 
European Convention, seemed to see September 11 as something 
that required no changes in its own doctrine.  
 It is often said that September 11 “changed everything.”  But 
from what we have seen in our survey of a number of major legal 
shift akin to the USA PATRIOT Act in the United States, 
September 11 may have changed specific legal responses to 
terrorism, but it did not fundamentally change the legal 
character of those institutions and states that reacted to the 
terrorist attacks.  Instead of making everything different, 
September 11 made the institutions and states whose reactions 
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we have reviewed here even more like themselves.    
